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HALLIBURTON, BASIC, AND FRAUD ON THE MARKET:
THE NEED FOR A NEW PARADIGM
CHARLES W. MURDOCK*
I. INTRODUCTION
WHEN the Supreme Court recently handed down its decision in Halli-burton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (“Halliburton II”),1 the decision
was not greeted with enthusiasm.  For liberals, it was adding yet another
hurdle to the class certification process.2  On the other hand, conserva-
tives had hoped that the Court would overturn its earlier decision in Basic
Inc. v. Levinson,3 which had adopted the “fraud on the market” theory of
reliance.  Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, argued for just such
a result.
Halliburton II is in some respects a strange opinion.  Both the majority
opinion and Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, which was in effect a
dissenting opinion, evidence both insight and tunnel vision.  Justice Rob-
erts preserved the opportunity to establish reliance in a class action but
continued to focus on market efficiency, a questionable, troublesome,
and, as applied, dubious concept.  Justice Thomas correctly pointed out
some of the flaws in the fraud on the market theory, but he would require
individualized proof of reliance, thereby eliminating the class action as a
remedy for misrepresentations by management of publicly traded corpora-
tions.  While the Basic theory is flawed, there is another, more straightfor-
ward way to establish reliance by members of a class: namely, that investors
rely, not on the integrity of market price, but rather on the integrity of the
information that corporate management inserts into the market.  Arguing
for this approach is the purpose of this Article.
In evaluating Supreme Court jurisprudence in the securities area, it is
essential to ask the following question: for whose benefit were the securi-
ties laws enacted?  The Securities Exchange Act of 19344 (“1934 Act”)
early on provides that the purpose of the Act is “to insure the maintenance
of fair and honest markets,”5 while section 10, pursuant to which Rule 10b-
5 was promulgated, gives the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
* Professor of Law and former Dean, Loyola University Chicago School of
Law.
1. 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
2. The Court determined that defendants, prior to class certification, could
rebut the presumption that the stock price reflected material misrepresentations
by introducing evidence on lack of price impact. See id. at 2416–17.
3. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 78 (2012)).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78b.
(203)
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authority to promulgate anti-fraud regulations “as necessary or appropri-
ate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”6
The Supreme Court itself has said that a “fundamental purpose [of
the securities laws is] to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of busi-
ness ethics in the securities industry.”7  The Court added that Congress
intended securities laws enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be
construed “not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its
remedial purposes.”8
Contrariwise, the recent stance of the Supreme Court and other fed-
eral courts often is to protect corrupt management from innocent inves-
tors.  Justice Thomas, in the conservative concurrence in Halliburton II,
asserted that “[l]ogic, economic realities, and our subsequent jurispru-
dence” dictate that “Basic should be overruled.”9  But the Court’s prior
jurisprudence in the Rule 10b-5 area is substantially flawed,10 and, con-
trary to Justice Thomas’s assertion, logic and economic reality demon-
strate that the conservative jurisprudence would emasculate investor
protection and provide a shield for unscrupulous management.
Protecting management at the expense of investors is getting the stat-
utory scheme upside down.  It would appear that the federal courts often
are living in an alternate universe.11  For example, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals believed that it had the authority under Basic, a decision which
is universally recognized as favorable to plaintiffs, “to tighten the require-
ments for plaintiffs seeking a presumption of reliance”12 in order to pro-
tect defendants from the “in terrorem power of certification.”13  It was the
dissent in Basic that was worried about the in terrorem effect of class certifi-
cation;14 the majority stated:
The modern securities markets, literally involving millions of
shares changing hands daily, differ from the face-to-face transac-
6. Id. § 78m(d)(1).
7. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
8. Id. at 195.
9. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2418 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring).
10. See generally Charles W. Murdock, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Deriva-
tive Traders: The Culmination of the Supreme Court’s Evolution from Liberal to Reaction-
ary in Rule 10b-5 Actions, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 369 (2014).
11. See generally Charles W. Murdock, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
and Particularity: Why Are Some Courts in an Alternate Universe?, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
615 (2014).
12. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261,
264–65 (5th Cir. 2007).
13. Id. at 267.
14. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 262 (1988) (White, J., dissenting)
(“I suspect that all too often the majority’s rule will ‘lead to large judgments, paya-
ble in the last analysis by innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and
their lawyers.’” (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc) (Friendly, J., concurring))).
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tions contemplated by early fraud cases, and our understanding
of Rule 10b-5’s reliance requirement must encompass these
differences.15
Federal courts often seem more concerned with protecting manage-
ment from strike suits than in protecting investors from fraud.16  In many
instances, either the courts’ understanding of business is woeful or the
opinions evidence a bias in favor of management.17  The Supreme Court
could hardly be unaware of the extensive fraud by many corporations in
the cases that have come before it.  Recent Supreme Court decisions have
dealt with channel stuffing and lying about whether a new product was
being shipped,18 conspiring with a supplier to inflate earnings,19 misrep-
resenting that a product did not cause patients to lose their sense of smell
when management was aware of injured users,20 changing accounting
methodology to inflate earnings,21 hiding wrongful conduct in connection
with market timing,22 and asserting that an FDA meeting was not focused
15. Id. at 243–44 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted).
16. Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scien-
tific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 175–81 (2008), took the majority to task for its
efforts to undercut the vitality of a private cause of action.  In true conservative
fashion, Justice Stevens looked at almost a century of precedent favoring the recog-
nition of implied private causes of action.  On the other hand, the conservative
members of the Court have little respect for precedent.  This is not conservative,
but rather reactionary.  Justice Scalia has said of Justice Thomas that Thomas
“doesn’t believe in stare decisis, period.” See Kenneth Jost, Justice Thomas’s Two De-
cades of Rejecting Precedent, JOST ON JUSTICE (Oct. 31, 2011, 7:41 AM), http://jos-
tonjustice.blogspot.com/2011/10/thomass-two-decades-of-rejecting.html.  Justice
Scalia himself is no fan of precedent: “Stare decisis is not an inexorable command or
a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.”  Fed. Election Comm’n
v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 500 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  Nor is Justice Alito: “It is a necessary concomitant of the doctrine of stare
decisis that a precedent is not always expanded to the limit of its logic.”  Hein v.
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 615 (2007).
17. See Murdock, supra note 11, at 624–30 (discussing court’s characterization
of plaintiff’s channel stuffing allegation—that K-Mart stores had fifty to one hun-
dred weeks of battery inventory, and that Walmart had thirty to fifty weeks of bat-
tery inventory—as being conclusory and lacking particularity).  Walmart in
particular is known as a leader in just-in-time inventory control. See id. at 635–39
(discussing court’s characterization of plaintiff’s extensive allegations of budgets,
forecasts, daily reports, monthly reports, and “Stop Ship” reports, which notified
management of manufacturing problems and their impact on volume shipments,
as boilerplate because other cases had also referenced internal reports as being
basis to hold senior management liable).
18. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 315 (2007).
19. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 153–54.
20. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1314 (2011).
21. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2181
(2011).
22. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296,
2299–301 (2011).
3
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upon the company’s products when in fact such products were the focus
of the meeting.23
From the foregoing litany, it is inconceivable that the Supreme Court
is not aware of the many circumstances in which ethically indifferent or
corrupt management has misled the investing public.  Yet, conservative
members of the Court have either turned a blind eye to management
fraud when issuing majority opinions24 or, in dissents or concurrences,
have advocated positions that would undercut investor protection in favor
of insulating corporations and management from accountability.25  There
is considerable antipathy by the conservative members of the Court to a
private civil remedy in the first place.  Justice Thomas, in his concurrence
in Halliburton II, began his opinion by asserting that “[t]he implied Rule
10b-5 private cause of action is ‘a relic of the heady days in which this
Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action.’”26
However, former Justice Stevens has pointed out that these heady
days persisted for 200 years: “Fashioning appropriate remedies for the vio-
lation of rules of law designed to protect a class of citizens was the routine
business of judges.”27  Moreover, highly regarded conservative Supreme
Court Justices, such as Tom Clark28 and John Harlan,29 have recognized
the important role that implied private causes of action play in the en-
forcement of the securities laws.  Justice Clark, in recognizing a private
cause of action under the proxy provisions of the 1934 Act, stated that
“[w]hile this language [of the Act] makes no specific reference to a private
right of action, among its chief purposes is ‘the protection of investors,’
which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to
achieve that result.”30  Expanding upon this statement in a later decision,
23. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1203
(2013).
24. See, e.g., Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2299–301; Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at
148, 153–54.
25. See, e.g., Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417–18 (2014) (Thomas, J., con-
curring) (arguing that Basic should be overruled); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 329–30 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that
inference of scienter is established only when plaintiff’s inference is “more plausible
than the inference of innocence”).
26. Haliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2417 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Correc-
tional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
27. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 177 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens refer-
enced Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), and stated, “[w]hile it is true that in
the early days state law was the source of most of those rules, throughout our his-
tory—until 1975—the same practice prevailed in federal courts with regard to fed-
eral statutes that left questions of remedy open for judges to answer.”  Id.
28. See Making the Case: Tom C. Clark (1899–1977), STATE BAR OF TEX., https://
www.texasbar.com/AM/PrinterTemplate.cfm?Section=Making_the_Case&Tem
plate=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=14873 (last visited Jan. 9, 2015).
29. See John Fox, Biographies of the Robes: John Marshall Harlan, II, PBS, http://
www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/rights/robes_harlan.html (last visited Jan. 9,
2015).
30. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
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Justice Harlan expressed his concern for the plight of small shareholders
and declined to take a position that “would be bound to discourage such
shareholders from the private enforcement of the proxy rules that ‘pro-
vides a necessary supplement to Commission action.’”31
While courts have been concerned about the in terrorem impact upon
corporations and management of permitting class actions to proceed,
there actually is a simple way for defendants to avoid such class action
certification: let management tell the truth in the first place.  Now, many
will regard such a solution as not only simplistic but also naı¨ve: cannot
plaintiff lawyers always twist some statement to make it appear misleading?
This concern is greatly overstated.  The particularity demanded by the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199532 (PSLRA) dampens this
concern.  Under that Act, plaintiffs must allege the misleading statements
with particularity,33 without the benefit of discovery,34 and with their attor-
neys exposed to sanctions if they do not conduct due diligence before
filing suit.35
On the other hand, under the present regime, there are many merito-
rious cases that are not certified as class actions, and thereby generally die,
because of the unrealistic requirements—as developed by the federal
courts—for class action certification.  Much of this revolves around
whether the securities are traded in an efficient market.36  This determina-
tion, in turn, is required because of the “fantasy”—in the view of Justice
Thomas—that investors rely upon the integrity of the market price.37
This Article asserts that investors rely not upon price, but upon the total
mix of information in the marketplace.  If courts do not recognize this
reality, they should at least recognize that what is necessary to establish
reliance is not that the stock is traded in an efficient market, but rather
that the misrepresentations in question had “price impact.”38
31. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 382 (1970) (quoting Borak, 377
U.S. at 432).
32. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. For example, see the First Circuit’s confounding analysis of whether the
market is efficient in In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005),
followed by an absurd opinion on remand, 453 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D. Mass. 2006).
For an in-depth discussion of the opinions in the PolyMedica litigation, see infra
notes 121–82 and accompanying text.
37. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring).
38. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Rethinking Basic, 69 BUS.
LAW. 671 (2014) (arguing that what plaintiffs should need to establish reliance is
not that there is efficient market, but rather that defendants’ representations have
caused fraudulent distortion of market).  For a further discussion of the arguments
presented by Professors Bebchuk and Ferrell, see infra notes 243–52 and accompa-
nying text.
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Since the Halliburton decisions build upon Basic, Basic and its weak-
nesses will first be considered in Part II.  The basic flaw in Basic was in
adopting an approach to reliance that focused upon price, which is the
result of information, rather than the information itself.  It is information
that investors rely upon, not price.
In Part III, the flaw in Halliburton II is analyzed, namely, the continued
reliance upon the notion of an “efficient” market as a predicate for
presuming reliance.  Paradoxically, this Article uses the Court’s own hypo-
thetical to illustrate that the success of plaintiffs’ litigation should depend,
not upon market efficiency, but rather upon price impact.  Part IV contin-
ues the analysis of why market efficiency, particularly as interpreted by the
federal courts, is an outmoded and dubious concept.  The Article uses the
various opinions in the PolyMedica litigation to illustrate the unreasonable
approach federal courts have taken in determining whether the market is
efficient.
Part V looks at the internal inconsistencies between Halliburton Co. v.
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (“Halliburton I”),39 Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retire-
ment Plans and Trust Funds,40 and Halliburton II, and argues that price im-
pact, materiality, and loss causation are all interrelated concepts that
should be determined, not at the certification stage, but in a trial on the
merits.  While this Article argues that all that should need to be proven at
the certification stage is information distortion, not price distortion, it also
considers an alternative approach using price distortion, as opposed to
market efficiency, as a basis for presuming reliance.
The Article’s conclusion asserts that the normative position of federal
courts should recognize that investors rely upon informational integrity,
rather than price integrity, and that the interrelated, intensely factual is-
sues of price impact, materiality, and loss causation should be reserved for
trial.
II. THE BASIC FLAW: FOCUSING ON EFFECT RATHER THAN CAUSE
A. The Problematic Focus on Price Integrity, Contrasted
with the Underlying Policies
Basic Inc. v. Levinson41 was an unusual case from a factual perspective.
Normally, when investors claim that they were defrauded, the fraud arises
from the company putting out positive information, thereby inducing the
investors to buy, when the situation was actually negative.  Consider Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc.,42 where the CEO made a series of posi-
tive and specific statements that one key product (the Titan 5500) was
experiencing continued growth and that a newer product (the Titan
39. 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
40. 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
41. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
42. 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006).
6
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6500) was ready to ship.  Contrariwise, demand for the 5500 was precip-
itously declining, and the 6500 was not yet being produced.43  These mis-
representations induced investors to buy.  On the other hand, in Basic, the
company put out negative information, namely, that no merger negotia-
tions were taking place, when the situation was actually positive.  Conse-
quently, the plaintiff investors sold shares.44
In Basic, the Court considered two issues: whether the merger negoti-
ations were material and whether the investors could establish reliance
based upon the fraud on the market theory.45  According to the Court,
the fraud on the market theory, “[s]uccinctly put,” is as follows:
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that,
in an open and developed securities market, the price of a com-
pany’s stock is determined by the available material information
regarding the company and its business . . . .  Misleading state-
ments will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the pur-
chasers do not directly rely on the misstatements . . . .  The causal
connection between the defendants’ fraud and the plaintiffs’
purchase of stock in such a case is no less significant than in a
case of direct reliance on misrepresentations.46
When the majority in Basic adopted the fraud on the market theory,
the Court stated that, in accepting the presumption of reliance, “we need
only believe that market professionals generally consider most publicly an-
nounced material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock
market prices.”47  The Court also stated that, by accepting this rebuttable
presumption, it did “not intend conclusively to adopt any particular theory
of how quickly and completely publicly available information is reflected
in market price.”48
The Court, while recognizing that “reliance is an element of a Rule
10b-5 cause of action” and that reliance “provides the requisite causal con-
nection between a defendant’s misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s injury,”
pointed out that there is “more than one way to demonstrate the causal
connection.”49  It acknowledged that Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United
States50 “dispensed with a requirement of positive proof of reliance, where
a duty to disclose material information had been breached, concluding
that the necessary nexus between the plaintiffs’ injury and the defendant’s
43. Id. at 593.
44. Basic, 485 U.S. at 227–28.
45. Id. at 226.
46. Id. at 241–42 (alterations in original) (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d
1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Id. at 246 n.24.
48. Id. at 248 n.28.
49. Id. at 243.
50. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
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wrongful conduct had been established [by the materiality of the omitted
information].”51
In Basic, the Court should simply have built upon its analysis from
Affiliated Ute Citizens.  In this latter case, the Court stated that where the
facts “involv[ed] primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is
not a prerequisite to recovery.  All that is necessary is that the facts with-
held be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have consid-
ered them important in the making of this decision.”52  Every
misrepresentation also includes a failure to disclose.
For example, again focusing on Tellabs, management stated that the
Titan 5500 was experiencing continued growth and that the Titan 6500
was ready to ship.  These were the misrepresentations.  But management
also failed to disclose that demand for the 5500 was precipitously declining
and that the 6500 was not yet ready to ship.  These were material facts, and
the failure to disclose these material facts was fraudulent.  Courts today
often fail to recognize that the antifraud provision embodied in Rule
10b-5 forbids not only misrepresentations (lies), but also failures to dis-
close facts to ensure that facts stated are not misleading (half-truths).
The Basic Court clearly recognized that there needed to be a different
approach with regard to reliance in transactions over “modern securities
markets, literally involving millions of shares changing hands daily,”53 as
contrasted with face-to-face transactions. In this regard, the Court quoted
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Blackie v. Barrack,54 to the effect that the
“causal nexus can be adequately established indirectly, by proof of materi-
ality coupled with the common sense that a stock purchaser does not ordi-
narily seek to purchase a loss in the form of artificially inflated stock.”55
The Court in effect recognized that requiring proof of individualized reli-
ance would effectively destroy the class action as a vehicle to remedy secur-
ities fraud.
The Basic Court also cited Blackie in support of its assertion that the
market informs the investor by impounding information into the value of
the stock.  There is language in Blackie to support that position: “Neverthe-
less, [the investor] relies generally on the supposition that the market
price is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially
inflated the price, and thus indirectly on the truth of the representations
underlying the stock price whether he is aware of it or not . . . .”56  But
51. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 153–54).
52. Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 153–54.
53. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243.  In point of fact, today billions of shares, not mil-
lions of shares, change hands daily. See Earnings Season Anxiety Sends Shares Lower,
N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/08/business/daily-
stock-market-activity.html (noting that on New York Stock Exchange, 3.2 billion
shares change hands in average trading day).
54. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975).
55. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245 (quoting Blackie, 524 F.2d at 908) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
56. Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907.
8
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both before and after the above quoted language, the Blackie court used
the Affiliated Ute Citizens approach to causation.  The court first stated: “We
think causation is adequately established in the impersonal stock ex-
change context by proof of purchase and of the materiality of misrepre-
sentations, without direct proof of reliance.”57  Later, the Blackie court
stated:
Here, the requirement [the burden of individualized reliance] is
redundant[:] the same causal nexus can be adequately estab-
lished indirectly, by proof of materiality coupled with the com-
mon sense that a stock purchaser does not ordinarily seek to
purchase a loss in the form of artificially inflated stock.  Under
those circumstances we think it appropriate to eliminate the bur-
den [of individualized reliance].58
Consequently, the Basic Court could have determined commonality
under the Affiliated Ute Citizens approach by determining that investors rely
upon the materiality of the misdisclosed facts.  When management speaks,
investors are entitled to rely on the truthfulness of the representations.
When those representations are material and false, the class action remedy
should be appropriate.
When the Court in Basic spoke of “integrity” in the market, it was
referring to the integrity of information, rather than of the stock price:
“Congress expressly relied on the premise that securities markets are af-
fected by information, and enacted legislation to facilitate an investor’s
reliance on the integrity of those markets . . . .”59  While the legislative
history upon which the Court relied also referred to market price, the key
phrase in the cited reports is that “the hiding and secreting of important
information obstructs the operation of the markets as indices of real
value.”60  As the Court observed, “[w]ho would knowingly roll the dice in a
crooked crap game?”61
From a policy standpoint, what does the foregoing reflect?  The Court
was clearly positively inclined toward the use of the class action as a vehicle
to remedy securities fraud in the public markets when it adopted the fraud
on the market theory.  Contrariwise, the dissent thought that the majority
opinion was a bit of a reach.62  The Court also recognized the importance
57. Id. at 906.
58. Id. at 908 (footnote omitted).
59. Basic, 485 U.S. at 246.
60. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1383, at 11 (1934)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
61. Id. at 247 (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535,
538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. See id. at 250–53 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The dissent stated, “[y]et today, the Court embraces this theory with the sweeping
confidence usually reserved for more mature legal doctrines.” Id. at 250–51.  “But
with no staff economists, no experts schooled in the ‘efficient-capital-market hy-
pothesis,’ no ability to test the validity of empirical market studies, we are not well
9
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of accurate information to inform the market.  Unfortunately, the Court
got the cart before the horse.  What investors rely upon is the integrity of
the information in the market.  The information then impacts the price of
the shares.  But the information is the cause, and the price is the effect.  In
focusing upon price, the fraud on the market theory is subject to the criti-
cism that investors do not believe that the stock price is “true”: investors
buying stock believe that the price is too low, whereas investors selling
stock believe that the price is too high.
Justice White, writing for the dissenters, challenged the assertion
from the cases relied upon by the majority that investors “rely on the price
of a stock as a reflection of its value.”63  According to the dissent, “many
investors purchase or sell stock because they believe the price inaccurately
reflects the corporation’s worth.”64  Moreover, according to the dissent,
“[i]f investors really believed that stock prices reflected a stock’s ‘value,’
many sellers would never sell, and many buyers never buy (given the time
and cost associated with executing a stock transaction).”65  It is hard to
quibble with the foregoing assertions since, if you asked a buyer why she
purchased, she might well respond “because the stock was undervalued;”
whereas, if you asked a seller of the same stock why he sold, he might well
respond that “the stock was overvalued.”66
However, the Basic dissent did recognize that the congressional policy
reflected in the securities laws called for “widespread public disclosure and
distribution to investors of material information concerning securities.”67
This policy “is expressed in the numerous and varied disclosure require-
ments found in the federal securities law scheme.”68  In addition to the
affirmative disclosure obligations under the securities laws, Congress also
equipped to embrace novel constructions of a statute based on contemporary
microeconomic theory.” Id. at 253.
63. Id. at 255 (quoting id. at 244 (majority opinion); Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d
1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Id. at 256 (quoting Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dis-
pensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV.
435, 455 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Id.
66. For example, consider Amazon.com.  Its price range for 2013 was from
$257 to $398.  One institutional investor sold its stake in Amazon last year. See
Deepa Seetharaman, Analysis—Amazon’s Far-Reaching Ambitions, Lack of Profits, Un-
nerve Investors, REUTERS (July 27, 2014, 8:30 AM), http://in.reuters.com/article/
2014/07/27/amazon-com-ambitions-idINKBN0FW01Y20140727.  Obviously, some-
one on the other side bought, and the price of Amazon did rise to a high of $408
in 2014, before slumping to $320.  One analyst has now downgraded Amazon. See
id.  Yet, Forbes is touting Amazon as a rare buying opportunity. See Gene Marcial,
Why Scorned Amazon.com Is Now a Rare Opportunistic Buy, FORBES (July 29, 2014, 6:59
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/genemarcial/2014/07/29/why-scorned-ama-
zon-com-is-now-a-rare-opportunistic-buy.
67. Basic, 485 U.S. at 258 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
68. Id. at 258–59 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d)).
10
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enacted a catchall anti-fraud prohibition, pursuant to which Rule 10b-5
was promulgated.
B. Upon What Do Investors Actually Rely?
If investors do not rely upon price, then upon what do they actually
rely?  As Justice White recognized, Congress has created an elaborate sys-
tem of disclosure in order that investors be informed.  Are not investors
entitled to rely on the presumption that corporations and their manage-
ment comply with the securities laws and make honest, accurate, and
truthful disclosures?  When people buy drugs, are they not entitled to rely
on the fact that the drugs meet FDA requirements?  When they purchase
meat, are they not entitled to rely on the fact that the meat meets U.S.
Department of Agriculture labeling standards?  As noted earlier, “[w]ho
would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?”69  Congress
clearly was concerned with “fair and honest markets,”70 and with the “pro-
tection of investors.”71
Unfortunately, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have become not
just conservative, but reactionary in their approach to enforcement of the
securities laws.72  According to the dissent in Basic, “[i]nvestors act on in-
evitably incomplete or inaccurate information, [consequently] there are
always winners and losers; but those who have ‘lost’ have not necessarily
been defrauded.”73  This cavalier approach to disclosure has had unto-
ward consequences.  The Dirks v. SEC74 decision, which was the source of
this quote, was a disaster, precipitating a dramatic increase in insider
trading.75
It is true that, in the securities world, there are winners and losers.
Supposedly, the market reflects the present worth of a company’s stream
of income out into the future.  Some people are more adroit than others
at analyzing the business plan of the company and the probability and
magnitude of its stream of income.  Thus, there are winners and losers.  In
69. Id. at 247 (majority opinion) (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc.,
555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012).
71. Id. § 78l.
72. See generally Murdock, supra note 10.
73. Basic, 485 U.S. at 256 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(second alteration in original) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 n.27
(1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
75. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 5 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 ITSA Report],
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2278 (“The current commission has made the
prosecution of insider trading a priority, and has brought more such cases during
the past four years than in all previous years combined.”); see also JAMES B. STEW-
ART, DEN OF THIEVES (1992). Dirks is discussed at length in Murdock, supra note
10, at 378 n.50.  The Dirks majority determined that a tippee was not liable for his
insider trading unless the tipper had sinned—breached a common-law fiduciary
duty—and that the tipper did not sin unless he received a pecuniary or a reputa-
tional benefit. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653–64.
11
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addition, the price of a company’s stock may be affected by unexpected
and unanticipated events, such as a typhoon or tsunami affecting the avail-
able supply of materials that the company needs,76 or a financial
meltdown caused by a real estate bubble.77  Or, a company’s management
may turn out to be incompetent.78  These are all risks to which all inves-
tors are subject.  But investors should not expect to bear the risk of securi-
ties fraud, which is why the securities laws were enacted to prevent it.
Thus, investors do rely upon the integrity of the information in the
securities markets about a company’s operations.  When management mis-
represents the company’s operations and potential earnings, and investors
buy at an inflated price, they should be able to bring a class action lawsuit
to recover the difference between the amount they paid—which was in-
flated by management’s misrepresentations—and the value at the time of
purchase of the securities—which often may be calculated by reference to
the drop in price when the true state of facts becomes public.
Consider once again the Tellabs situation.  In 2000, Tellabs was a
highflying tech company79 with a major product, the Titan 5500, and an
upgraded version, the Titan 6500, which was supposedly ready to ship.
The stock was a growth stock, reaching a high of $67 per share and selling
at almost forty times earnings.80  To maintain such a price, continued
growth was essential.81
76. See, e.g., Tim Mojonnier, Reducing Risk in the Automotive Supply Chain, BUS.
THEORY: BUS. BEST PRACTICES, http://businesstheory.com/reducing-risk-automo-
tive-supply-chain-2/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2015) (discussing complexity of automo-
tive supply chain and how disruptions in production can result from shortage of
even one part); see also Linda Conrad, Japan One Year Later: The Long View on Tech
Supply Chains, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2012, 8:09 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ci-
ocentral/2012/03/13/japan-one-year-later-the-long-view-on-tech-supply-chains/
(describing how shortage in supply of critical parts in automotive industry after
earthquake and ensuing tsunami in Japan halted production for suppliers and
subcontractors).
77. After the financial meltdown, real estate lending dried up, thereby ad-
versely affecting many businesses.
78. Consider the bailout of General Motors resulting from decades of mis-
management; also consider the necessity to bail out major banks in the United
States as a result of their improvident investing in toxic securities that led to the
financial meltdown.  More recently, after the London Whale debacle, in which J.P.
Morgan lost about $6 billion, the stock of J.P. Morgan dropped as much as 24% in
a month.
79. See Anna Marie Kukec, Naperville’s Tellabs to Be Acquired for $891 Million,
DAILY HERALD (Oct. 22, 2013, 7:36 AM), http://www.dailyherald.com/article/2013
1021/business/710219902/.
80. Earnings-per-share in 2000 were $1.75. See Steve Daniels, Annual Meetings:
Tellabs, Minuteman, Fortune Brands, FMC, Exelon, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Apr. 28, 2001),
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20010428/ISSUE01/100016335/annu
al-meetings-tellabs-minuteman-fortune-brands-fmc-exelon?template=printart.  The
stock also reached a high of $67. See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc.,
437 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2006).  Thus, the price-earnings ratio was almost forty.
81. When stock sells at a high price/earnings ratio, the value of the stock is
heavily dependent upon the anticipated growth rate:
CR = DR – G
12
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From December 2000 through April 2001, the CEO made, or caused
to be made, a series of positive statements about the company that were
designed to assure investors that the existing growth would continue.  On
December 11, 2000, a press release was issued to the effect that the 5500
was experiencing continuing growth and that the 6500 was now availa-
ble.82  On January 23, 2001, there was another press release and an inves-
tor conference call in which “robust growth” was touted and the fact that
“customers are buying more and more Tellabs equipment” was asserted.83
On February 14, 2001, a letter was sent to Tellabs’ shareholders toting
“robust growth,” asserting that sales of the 5500 had soared 56% in 2000,
and stating that customers were embracing the 6500.84  The accompany-
ing annual report stated that the 5500 was going strong.  In March, there
was another investor telephone call at which it was stated that the 5500 was
maintaining its growth rate85 and that demand for the 6500 continued to
grow.86
In March, the first quarter revenue projection was reduced from a
range of $865–$890 million to $830–$865 million.87  On April 6, the first
quarter revenue projection was reduced to $772 million, and the price of
the stock dropped to about $30 a share.88  It gradually moved up to $38
per share, but, on June 19, 2001, Tellabs announced a substantial reduc-
tion in its second quarter projections—from $780–$820 million to only
$500 million—and, at another investor conference call, the CEO an-
nounced that the reduction “was almost entirely because of an enormous
reduction in TITAN 5500 sales;” the price plummeted to about $16 per
share.89  Tellabs had been engaged in channel stuffing,90 and the channel
stuffing was so extensive that, “[a]ccording to the plaintiffs’ confidential
sources, Tellabs had to lease extra storage space in January and February
2001 to accommodate the large number of returns.”91  Tellabs manage-
Therefore, the larger the growth rate, the lower the capitalization rate.  The capi-
talization rate is inversely proportional to the price-earnings multiple.  Thus, the
larger the growth rate, the higher the price-earnings multiple.  Since a rudimen-
tary approach to the value of a company is earnings times the price-earnings multi-
ple, a decrease in earnings (and, consequently, growth) is a double whammy: it
reduces the earnings, and the reduced earnings lower growth and thereby increase
the capitalization rate, consequently reducing the price-earnings ratio.
82. Tellabs, 437 F.3d at 592.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 592–93.
86. Id. at 592.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 593.
89. Id.
90. The practice of channel stuffing, and its impact upon earnings and stock
price, is discussed extensively in Murdock, supra note 11, at 625–32.
91. Tellabs, 437 F.3d at 598.
13
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ment clearly knew that sales of the 5500 were in the process of dropping
dramatically.92
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion in Halliburton II, asserted
that courts should employ “logic” and observe “economic realities.”93
Then let us look at the logic and economic realities of the Tellabs situa-
tion.  First of all, the information in the marketplace in the first quarter of
2001 was that Tellabs was continuing as a high-tech growth company.
Someone buying stock in Tellabs would have that view of the company, a
view that management sought to reinforce by its comments from Decem-
ber 2000 to March 2001.
That is the factual milieu upon which anyone purchasing Tellabs’
stock would operate.  That is the factual milieu which would determine
the price of the Tellabs stock.  Investors94 universally rely upon the busi-
ness plan of the company and the cash flow generated by its operations
pursuant to that business plan; the stock price then follows.  Information
about a company’s business plan and the results of its operations are dis-
closed to the market through the securities laws’ mandatory disclosure sys-
tem and management’s discussions and releases complementing this
disclosure system.  Thus, investors rely upon the total mix of information
in the marketplace.  This mix of information presumptively is the same for
all investors.  Some investors may bring more skilled analysis to this infor-
mation than other investors.  But the mix of information upon which they
are operating is the same, thus the reliance element in Rule 10b-5 is one
that is common to all investors.
Some investors may have been directly aware of some of this informa-
tion, for example, those who sat in on the investor conference call.  Others
may have been aware of this mix of information indirectly, through re-
92. The Seventh Circuit described the situation as follows:
By January 2001, the complaint asserts, demand for Tellabs’s “best
seller”—the TITAN 5500—was drying up.  Verizon, Tellabs’s largest cus-
tomer, reduced its orders for the TITAN 5500 by roughly 25% in late
2000 and by roughly 50% in January 2001.  Customers in Latin America
and Central America were no longer buying the product.  By late 2000,
according to a couple of the confidential sources, Tellabs had excess TI-
TAN 5500s on hand because of the lack of demand.  One confidential
source informed the plaintiffs that Tellabs paid Probe Research, an
outside company, $100,000 to forecast demand for the TITAN 5500.
Completed “in or about early 2001,” the report showed that the market
need for the TITAN 5500 was evaporating.  Based on this research, Tel-
labs’s marketing strategy department distributed an internal memoran-
dum that concluded that revenue from the TITAN 5500 would decline by
about $400 million.
Id. at 597.
93. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2418 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring).
94. It is important to draw a distinction between investors and traders.  Trad-
ers, particularly high-speed traders, make their money on market volatility.  Thus,
they are only indirectly concerned with the company’s business plan and opera-
tions. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS (2014); SCOTT PATTERSON, DARK
POOLS (2013).
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss1/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-1\VLR105.txt unknown Seq: 15  9-MAR-15 10:28
2015] THE NEED FOR A NEW PARADIGM 217
ports in the media or recommendations of their stockbrokers.  But all are
operating on the same mix of information.  If we were to require individ-
ual reliance, some institutional investors who were following Tellabs stock
could bring suit directly and might have a sufficient economic stake to
bear the risk of litigation.
But no small investor would have a sufficient economic stake to bring
an individual cause of action.  I personally bought 1000 shares of Tellabs
stock around this time.  But even if I were to lose $30 a share, from the
standpoint of time, it would not be worth it to me to file suit on my own
behalf.  A non-attorney investor is in an even worse place.  She must en-
gage a lawyer sufficiently sophisticated in securities litigation to represent
her at $300 to $400 per hour or even higher.  The attorney must conduct a
substantial due diligence investigation prior to bringing suit or be subject
to sanctions pursuant to the PSLRA.95  The complaint must be drafted
with great detail (particularity) pursuant to the PSLRA, in order to defeat
a motion to dismiss, and there is no discovery prior to the hearing on the
motion to dismiss.  Thus, an individual investor could expect the need to
front a substantial amount of money to bring suit, which could end up
exceeding any possible recovery.  And no attorney would take such a suit
on a contingency basis.  There simply is not a sufficient economic stake to
warrant the time, cost, and risk of litigation.  Thus, were the courts to rule
out class action status, the net result would be to leave the small investor
without a remedy.  Should the securities laws be premised on the basis that
only some institutional investors are entitled to the protection of the law?
Consequently, Basic appropriately recognized that, in these situations,
reliance must be based on that which provides commonality to all inves-
tors.  The error in Basic was in adopting a doctrine based on an economic
theory that an individual investor could not beat the market.96  This trans-
ferred the reliance element from a focus on the information to a focus on
the price of the stock that flows from the information.  Federal courts
should leave economic theory to economists and instead deal with that
with which the federal courts have dealt for decades: the disclosure obliga-
tions of a company and the fraudulent misrepresentations by those in con-
trol of a company that are aimed at defrauding the market in general.
Therefore, courts should recognize that all investors rely upon the total
mix of information in the market, most of which—practically all the mis-
leading information—is introduced to the market by corporate
management.
95. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).
96. See In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Lit., 432 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The
efficient market hypothesis began as an academic attempt to answer the following
question: Can an ordinary investor beat the stock market, that is, can such an inves-
tor make trading profits on the basis of new information?  In an efficient market,
the answer is ‘no,’ because the information that would have given the investor a
competitive edge and allowed the investor to ‘beat’ the market is already reflected
in the market price.” (citing Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An
Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 639 (2003))).
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As a caveat to this approach, it should be recognized that a particular
statute, section 18 of the 1934 Act,97 provides a cause of action for a mis-
leading statement in any document filed with the SEC.  With respect to
this cause of action, courts have held that individualized reliance must be
alleged and proven.98  Thus, supposedly by analogy, since the mix of infor-
mation in the marketplace includes documents filed with the SEC, it could
be argued that individualized reliance, and not a presumption of common
reliance, is necessary when dealing with misleading corporate filings.
However, two factors militate against importing the section 18 ap-
proach to reliance into a Rule 10b-5 class action case.  First of all, the mix
of information in the marketplace includes not just documents filed with
the SEC but also much additional material.  As illustrated by the previous
discussion with respect to Tellabs, misleading information produced by
corporate management may be promulgated through press releases, let-
ters to shareholders, or investor conference calls.  Thus, a cause of action
under Rule 10b-5 conceivably could rely exclusively upon statements made
outside of documentation filed with the SEC.
More importantly, even if some of the misleading statements are in-
cluded in documents filed with the SEC, a cause of action under Rule
10b-5 differs substantially from a cause of action under section 18.  Under
section 18, courts have held that plaintiffs need not allege scienter,99
whereas under Rule 10b-5, scienter must be pleaded with particularity.100
III. THE HALLIBURTON FLAW: RETAINING THE FOCUS
ON MARKET EFFICIENCY
A. The Halliburton II Decision
Halliburton II101 differs markedly from Halliburton I.102  The Hallibur-
ton I decision was short, was adopted unanimously, and focused upon only
one issue: whether plaintiffs must establish loss causation at the certifica-
tion stage.103  The Halliburton II decision was lengthy, produced various
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78r.
98. See, e.g., In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 283 (3d
Cir. 2006) (“SSF Plaintiffs concede that to state their claim under Section 18, they
were required to plead actual, as opposed to presumed, reliance upon a false or
misleading statement.”); Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir.
2000) (“[C]ourts have required a purchaser’s actual reliance on the fraudulent
statement under § 18(a), as opposed to the constructive reliance, or fraud-on-the-
market, theory available under § 10(b).”); see also Brief on Behalf of Appellants at
44, In re Suprema Specialties., 438 F. 3d 256 (No. 04-3755), 2004 WL 5327687 (citing
Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 916 (2d Cir. 1968)).
99. See, e.g., In re Suprema Specialties, 438 F.3d at 283 (“A Section 18 plaintiff,
however, bears no burden of proving that the defendant acted with scienter or any
particular state of mind.”).
100. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
101. 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
102. 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
103. The Court determined that plaintiffs need not. See id. at 2184–87.
16
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opinions, though only one judgment, and dealt with three issues:
(i) whether Basic should be overruled, (ii) whether plaintiffs should be
required to establish price impact at the certification stage, and
(iii) whether defendants should have the opportunity to establish lack of
price impact at the certification stage.104
With respect to the first issue, the Court in Halliburton II found no
policy reason to overrule Basic.  However, the Court did engage in some
convoluted analysis to justify the “reliance on price” aspect of Basic and,
unfortunately, retained “market efficiency” as one of the four prerequi-
sites for invoking the presumption of reliance.105  The other three prereq-
uisites are publicity, materiality, and market timing.106  Plaintiffs have the
burden of proving these prerequisites, and, with the exception of material-
ity,107 they must be satisfied before class certification.108  As will be ad-
dressed below, the Court’s own logic supports the argument that what
plaintiffs must establish is not market efficiency, but rather price
impact.109
The Court also rejected Halliburton’s argument that plaintiffs should
be required to prove that “defendant’s misrepresentation actually affected
the stock price—so-called ‘price impact’—in order to invoke the Basic pre-
sumption.”110  According to the Court:
What is called the Basic presumption actually incorporates two
constituent presumptions: First, if a plaintiff shows that the de-
fendant’s misrepresentation was public and material and that the
stock traded in a generally efficient market, he is entitled to a
presumption that the misrepresentation affected the stock price.
Second, if the plaintiff also shows that he purchased the stock at
the market price during the relevant period, he is entitled to a
further presumption that he purchased the stock in reliance on
the defendant’s misrepresentation.111
According to the Court, “[b]y requiring plaintiffs to prove price impact
directly, Halliburton’s proposal would take away the first constituent pre-
sumption.”112  The Court concluded that “[f]or the same reasons we de-
clined to completely jettison the Basic presumption, we decline to
effectively jettison half of it by revising the prerequisites for invoking it.”113
104. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2405.
105. See id. at 2416, 2424.
106. See id. at 2412.
107. In Amgen, discussed infra at notes 222–31 and accompanying text, the
Court, in a conflictual opinion, determined that plaintiffs need not establish mate-
riality at the certification stage.
108. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2412.
109. See infra notes 110–14 and accompanying text.
110. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2413
111. Id. at 2414.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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What the Court did determine was that the defendant could intro-
duce evidence to establish a lack of price impact in the particular case so
as to rebut the presumption of reliance.  The Court held that “defendants
must be afforded an opportunity before class certification to defeat the
presumption through evidence that an alleged misrepresentation did not
actually affect the market price of the stock.”114
This is basically gobbledygook.  The Court acts as though it is doing
plaintiffs a favor by rejecting the requirement for plaintiffs to show “price
impact” specifically, but the Court retains the requirement to show that
the market was efficient—a requirement which necessitates plaintiffs es-
tablishing price impact generally, rather than specifically.  Additionally, by
permitting defendants to prove the lack of price impact, the Court indi-
rectly requires plaintiffs to litigate price impact at the certification stage.
Plaintiffs would have been better off if the Court had required plaintiffs to
prove price impact at the certification stage but had jettisoned the require-
ment to establish “market efficiency,” a concept which is not just amor-
phous and disputed, but which also adds substantially to the cost of
litigation by generating a battle of the experts on a generalized
proposition.
Litigation would be much more efficient if the role of experts were
limited to determining whether, in this particular case, there was a price
impact from the misrepresentation.  And, determining price impact is ba-
sically the same concept as loss causation, which the Court determined
plaintiffs need not establish at the certification stage.  Thus, as discussed in
the analysis of Basic, all plaintiffs should need to show at the certification
stage is that the defendants introduced misrepresentations into the mar-
ketplace which altered the mix of reliable information upon which inves-
tors rely.  But this is basically the definition of materiality, which the Court
has determined need not be established until the trial stage.  Thus, logi-
cally, price impact, materiality, and loss causation are related concepts that
should be litigated at a trial on the merits.
B. The Court’s Hypothetical—A Two-Way Street
In holding that defendants must be afforded the opportunity to rebut
the presumption of reliance by establishing that the misrepresentation did
not affect the market price, the Court used this hypothetical:
Suppose a defendant at the certification stage submits an event
study looking at the impact on the price of its stock from six dis-
crete events, in an effort to refute the plaintiffs’ claim of general
market efficiency.  All agree the defendant may do this.  Suppose
one of the six events is the specific misrepresentation asserted by
the plaintiffs.  All agree that this too is perfectly acceptable.  Now
suppose the district court determines that, despite the defen-
114. Id. at 2417.
18
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dant’s study, the plaintiff has carried its burden to prove market
efficiency, but that the evidence shows no price impact with re-
spect to the specific misrepresentation challenged in the suit.
The evidence at the certification stage thus shows an efficient
market, on which the alleged misrepresentation had no price
impact.115
In this hypothetical situation, the market for the stock is generally effi-
cient, which would normally suffice to establish the fraud on the market
presumption.  But the particular misrepresentation that is being litigated
did not affect the price of the stock.  The Court thought that it would be
“bizarre”116 to enable the plaintiff to get past the certification stage by
virtue of indirect evidence when direct evidence was available to show the
plaintiff was not injured.117  The Court concluded: “While Basic allows
plaintiffs to establish that precondition indirectly, it does not require
courts to ignore a defendant’s direct, more salient evidence showing that
the alleged misrepresentation did not actually affect the stock’s market
price and, consequently, that the Basic presumption does not apply.”118
The Court’s position would seem reasonable: if the price were not
affected by the alleged misrepresentation, then either the misrepresenta-
tion was not material or the plaintiff had not suffered any loss.  Why pro-
ceed to trial?
On the other hand, the converse of the Court’s hypothetical can
demonstrate why the fraud on the market theory is flawed as a result of its
focus upon market efficiency.  Suppose, as the Supreme Court did, that
there was a situation in which there were six event studies, one of which
was the specific representation in the instant suit.  Assume further that five
of the event studies showed no price impact, but that the specific represen-
tation in the instant suit did show a marked impact on price.  A defendant
could make the case that the market was not efficient, and, therefore, the
fraud on the market presumption was not applicable.  Consequently, class
certification would fail, and, most likely, the suit would die, particularly if
plaintiffs were only small investors who could not afford to bring a direct
action.  This would be so even though the plaintiffs established that the
corrective disclosure caused the market price to drop dramatically,
thereby leaving plaintiffs with worthless stock.  Does this make sense?
A much more sensible regime would be to have a presumption—
which is not really a presumption but rather a reality—that investors rely
upon the total mix of information in the market; when this mix is fraudu-
lently created by the misrepresentations of management, affected inves-
115. Id. at 2415.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2416.  The fact that the misrepresentation did not affect the price
of the stock could mean either that the misrepresentation was not material or the
plaintiff had not established loss causation.
118. Id.
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tors can bring a class action lawsuit.  This should suffice for class
certification.  This is what should be the normative position for federal
courts to take.
But, if more be needed, then require plaintiffs to establish “price im-
pact.”  Under this variation, plaintiffs’ burden would be less than exists at
present to establish that the misrepresentation took place in an efficient
market, since plaintiffs need deal only with one event-study—the current
misrepresentation—rather than a multitude of event studies.  Moreover,
plaintiffs would not be assaulted by the various views as to whether all in-
formation must be incorporated into the price of the stock, or whether
merely most publicly available information must be so incorporated, or
how quickly the information must be incorporated into the price.
But evidence establishing price impact would probably also establish
materiality and loss causation.  In effect, we would be moving the trial on
the merits stage to the class certification stage.  It is better to presume
reliance based upon the defendant’s insertion of misleading information
into the market, grant class certification, and leave any factual issues for
trial.  Otherwise, as Professor Langevoort has stated:
A detailed resolution of market-impact and loss-causation issues
at the class-certification stage substitutes fact finding by the judge
on an extraordinarily complex issue at an early stage of the pro-
ceeding for fact finding by the jury at trial and gives appellate
courts far greater authority to review those findings.119
IV. RETAINING A FOCUS ON MARKET EFFICIENCY IS UNREASONABLE,
OUTDATED, AND IS MERELY A DEVICE TO INCREASE LITIGATION
COSTS AND THWART MERITORIOUS LITIGATION
The converse of Justice Roberts’s hypothetical, discussed above, illus-
trates one reason why requiring market efficiency as a condition for reli-
ance is irrational.  What difference does it make whether or not other
information is integrated into the market price if the plaintiff can demon-
strate that the misrepresentation of which the plaintiff complained did
affect market price?  A market could be fairly inefficient but, if the misrep-
resentation were significant enough, it could affect market price and ad-
versely impact plaintiffs, thereby causing their loss.
Moreover, as Professors Prichard and Henderson assert in their brief
to the Supreme Court in the Halliburton II case:
[P]roving the efficiency of the market as a whole is only an indi-
rect means of proving that the market relied on a particular state-
ment. . . .  [D]etermining whether a misstatement distorted the
market is typically easier than demonstrating efficiency of the
market as a whole.  It is also a more direct means of inquiring
119. Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market,
2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 185–86 (2009).
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into reliance, and a more reliable method of showing whether
the complained-of fraud was, in fact, a “fraud on the market.”120
A. PolyMedica: A Leading Case Exemplifying the Unreasonable Application
of Market Efficiency
1. The PolyMedica Facts
The stock of Polymedica, a distributor of diabetes testing supplies,
traded as high as $58.25 during the quarter ending December 31, 2000.121
Apparently because of short selling pressure,122 the high in the following
quarter was $44.123  Toward the end of that quarter, CIBC World Markets
announced that there was an investigation into PolyMedica for Medicare
fraud.  The stock plummeted from $33 to $17.124  The next business day,
March 26, 2001, PolyMedica held an investor conference call, reassuring
investors and extolling its efficient systems and highly trained and dedi-
cated personnel.125  A company official referenced a two-year-old com-
plaint to Health and Human Services and asserted that, in view of the
60,000 to 90,000 shipments PolyMedica made per month, there will always
be some customer complaints.126  Thereafter, the stock rose to $48 in the
quarter ending September 30, 2001.127  However, in late July of that quar-
ter, the New York Stock Exchange declined to list PolyMedica stock, and,
on August 6th, Barron’s disclosed that a federal grand jury was looking into
possible Medicare and investor fraud.128  The stock dropped to $22 after
the Barron’s article, and it further dropped to $14 when, a couple of days
later, PolyMedica finally admitted that a criminal investigation was under-
way.129  The stock eventually dropped to $11.25.130
120. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 24,
Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317) [hereinafter Brief of Law
Professors], 2014 WL 60721.
121. See PolyMedica Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 9 (Mar. 31, 2002)
[hereinafter Polymedica Annual Report], available at http://www.sec.gov/Arch
ives/edgar/data/878748/000095013502003171/b43472pce10vk.txt.
122. See Medical-Device Maker PolyMedica Plunges Amid Short Sales, SMART MONEY
(Mar. 23, 2001, 8:57 PM) [hereinafter PolyMedica Plunges], available at http://
boards.fool.com/news-about-sell-off-14621230.aspx?sort=whole.
123. See PolyMedica Annual Report, supra note 121, at 9.
124. See PolyMedica Plunges, supra note 122; see also PolyMedica Annual Report,
supra note 121, at 9.
125. See PolicyMedica Plunges, supra note 122.
126. See id.
127. See PolyMedica Annual Report, supra note 121, at 9.
128. See Cheryl Strauss Einhorn, Endgame?: Subpoenas Are Flying as a Grand Jury
Probes PolyMedica, BARRON’S (Aug. 6, 2001, 12:01 AM), http://online.barrons.com/
news/articles/SB996889574847436135?tesla=y.
129. See Cheryl Strauss Einhorn, Coming Clean: PolyMedica Admits Feds Seek
Criminal Charges, BARRON’S (Aug. 13, 2001, 12:01 AM), http://online.barrons
.com/news/articles/SB997481781738978939?tesla=y.
130. See PolyMedica Annual Report, supra note 121.
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According to PolyMedica’s employees, the company often shipped
products to customers that the customers did not order, and, even though
these products were often returned, “[o]ver 90% of returns are not re-
funded to Medicare.”131  At the end of one month on a Friday, the com-
pany was 10,000 orders short of their goal; magically, the 10,000 orders
appeared by the close of the day on Saturday.132  The company would also
load up trucks from its warehouses and then have the trucks sit in the
warehouse parking lot because there were no orders.133  When employees
tried to inform management of improper activity, they were “met with si-
lence or reprimand.”134  PolyMedica eventually settled the criminal
charges with the Justice Department by paying $35 million.135
One would think that the foregoing situation would be a matter of
concern for the federal courts.  Medicare fraud is a serious matter.  Conse-
quently, it will be instructive to contrast the approach of the district court
in its initial opinion granting certification, with the circuit court opinion
reversing on the basis of its definition of an efficient market, and the dis-
trict court opinion on remand, applying the circuit court’s view on market
efficiency.
2. The Initial District Court Opinion: A Sensible Approach Applying Basic
Judge Keeton’s opinion in In re PolyMedica Corp. Securities Litigation,136
which granted class certification, is a joy to read: it is clear, concise, and
cogent.  In applying the fraud on the market theory, he relied upon the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Basic, rather than upon academics arguing
about the concept of an efficient market and courts relying upon the aca-
demics.137  He essentially adopted the plaintiffs’ assertion that “the essen-
tial factor in determining market efficiency is whether the stock price was
affected by the material information available in the market.”138
Looking to Basic, Judge Keeton relied upon three statements by the
Basic Court:
(i) The presumption is support [sic] by common sense and
probability . . . .  Because most publicly available information
is reflected in market price, an investor’s reliance . . . may
be presumed . . . .139
131. Einhorn, supra note 128.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. PolyMedica Settles with the Feds; $35-Million Deal Ends 5-Year Probe, HME
NEWS (Nov. 30, 2004), http://www.hmenews.com/article/polymedica-settles-feds-
35-million-deal-ends-5-year-probe.
136. 224 F.R.D. 27 (D. Mass. 2004), rev’d, 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
137. See id. at 39.
138. Id. at 40.
139. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 247 (1988)).
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(ii) We need not determine by adjudication what economists
and social scientists have debated . . . .  [W]e need only be-
lieve that market professionals generally consider most pub-
licly announced material statements about companies,
thereby affecting stock market prices.140
(iii) [W]e do not intend conclusively to adopt any particular the-
ory of how quickly and completely publicly available infor-
mation is reflected in market price.141
Based upon the foregoing, he concluded:
Considering the three statements together, I conclude that an
“efficient” market in the context of the “fraud on the market”
theory is not one in which a stock price rapidly reflects all publicly
available material information.  Rather, the “efficient” market re-
quired for “fraud on the market” presumption of reliance is sim-
ply one in which “market professionals generally consider most
publicly announced material statements about companies,
thereby affecting stock market prices.”142
Applying the above standard to the facts presented to him, Judge Keeton
noted the following:
(i) There was a cause-and-effect relationship between unex-
pected disclosures regarding the corporation and an im-
mediate response in the stock price: “In particular, at five
points in 2001 . . ., PolyMedica stock price rose [dramati-
cally] on news of greater than expected growth and fell
[dramatically] on negative news about the Company.”143
(ii) The average weekly trading volume exceeded one million
shares, which was around 10% of the shares
outstanding.144
(iii) “[E]ighteen different securities analysts followed
PolyMedica” and “at least four securities analysts issued at
least seventeen analyst reports.”145
(iv) There were “at least 283 market makers [ ] in the market
for PolyMedica common stock . . . .”146
140. Id. (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 246 n.24).
141. Id. at 40–41 (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 249 n.9).
142. Id. at 41 (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 246 n.24).
143. Id. at 43 (second and third alterations in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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(v) The market capitalization exceeded $200 million.147
From the foregoing, Judge Keeton, in the opinion of the Author, reasona-
bly concluded that the market was efficient and that the fraud on the mar-
ket presumption applied.148
3. The Circuit Court and the District Court on Remand: An Example of
Courts in an Alternate Universe
a. The Circuit Court: A Stringent Definition of Market Efficiency
At the outset of the First Circuit’s opinion in PolyMedica,149 it acknowl-
edged that, according to the plaintiff, PolyMedica’s stock had lost more
than 80% of its value, and PolyMedica had engaged in welfare fraud.150
At the time of its opinion, in December 2005, these facts were easily verifi-
able.  While judges are supposed to be bias free (an illusion since every-
one’s decision-making is affected by bias151), would not the instinct of
someone who was concerned about fraud in the securities markets be to
certify the class to determine what the facts really were?  This would be
particularly so when presented with the clear, concise, and cogent analysis
of Judge Keeton.
The circuit court recognized the Basic pronouncements relied upon
by the district court but also focused upon other statements, such as:
“[T]he market is acting as the unpaid agent of the investor, in-
forming him that given all the information available to it, the value
of the stock is worth the market price,” and that “the market
price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all pub-
licly available information, and hence, any material
misrepresentations.”152
The circuit court concluded that the Supreme Court’s language in Basic
could support either the lower court’s interpretation of efficiency or the
view adopted by most lower courts that the stock price must “fully reflect
all publicly available information.”153
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
150. See id. at 3.
151. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
Kahneman is a Nobel Prize winner for his work in behavioral economics.  His re-
cent book discusses two systems of thinking: “thinking fast,” which operates auto-
matically and quickly with little effort, and “thinking slow,” which is deliberative
and analytical.  The first system initially produces the information upon which the
second system thoughtfully operates.  That is how bias can creep into decisions
which we believe are thoughtfully made.  For a more extensive discussion, see
Charles W. Murdock & Barry Sullivan, What Kahneman Means for Lawyers: Some Re-
flections on Thinking, Fast and Slow, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1377 (2013).
152. PolyMedica, 432 F.3d at 11 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 244,
246 (1988)).
153. Id. at 12–13.
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The problem with this formulation, as discussed in the next section, is
that the “fully reflect all publicly available information” standard is impossi-
ble to prove, relies upon the conjecture of so-called experts, and is not
realistic, particularly when coupled with the circuit court’s add-on that the
information must be “incorporate[d] rapidly or promptly.”154  The court
stated that, “[b]y ‘fully reflect,’ we mean that market price responds so
quickly to new information that ordinary investors cannot make trading
profits on the basis of such information.  This is known as ‘informational
efficiency.’”155  Although the court did not require “fundamental value
efficiency,” which means that the market price is also accurate, it did rec-
ognize that fundamental value efficiency could be relevant to informa-
tional efficiency.156
Again, as developed in the next section, it is clear that markets incor-
porate different types of information at different rates, depending upon
the complexity and mode of distribution of the information.157
b. The District Court on Remand: An Unreasonable Application of a
Stringent Standard
(i) Plaintiffs’ Strong Evidence of Market Efficiency
On remand, the district court158 looked at the plaintiffs’ evidence,
primarily focusing upon the five Cammer factors, which many courts have
used to determine whether the market for a particular stock is efficient.159
The court analyzed them as follows:
(1) Average trading volume: the average weekly trading volume
was 4,140,232 shares, which accounted for 31% of the
13,280,000 total shares outstanding. Cammer suggested that a
2% weekly trading volume “warranted a strong presumption
of market efficiency.”160
(2) Number of securities analysts: seven analysts followed the
stock, and there were 348 articles mentioning
154. Id. at 12.
155. Id. at 19.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D. Mass. 2006).
In the interim, Judge Keeton had retired, and the case was reassigned to Judge
Young. See id. at 264.
159. See Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–87 (D.N.J. 1989).  The
factors are: (1) the stock’s average trading volume; (2) the number of securities
analysts that followed and reported on the stock; (3) the presence of market mak-
ers and arbitrageurs; (4) the company’s eligibility to file a Form S–3 Registration
Statement; and (5) a cause-and-effect relationship, over time, between unexpected
corporate events or financial releases and an immediate response in stock price.
See id.
160. See PolyMedica, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 267.
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PolyMedica.161  A previous decision in the First Circuit had
approved efficiency even though there was only one ana-
lyst.162  The court said that the strength of this factor “is un-
certain because there exists no coherent yardstick against
which to measure it,” even though the court also recognized
that, according to one study, this factor “is one of only two
which actually have statistically significant, empirical
support.”163
(3) Presence of market makers: there were 193 market makers,
of whom 27 traded over one million shares each.164  Previ-
ous First Circuit decisions had approved class certification
with substantially less market-making activity.165  However,
the court stated that, since there is “no accepted standard” to
determine the minimum number, the court would place lit-
tle weight on this factor.166
(4) Eligibility to file an S-3 registration statement: in order to use
this form, the SEC requires a market capitalization of $75
million, not counting stock held by management.167  The ra-
tionale behind this requirement is that, at this level of mar-
ket capitalization, there will be sufficient analyst and investor
interest to ensure that information is widely disseminated
and integrated.  The court acknowledged that “[c]ourts have
found that the SEC permits an S–3 Registration statement
‘only on the premise that the stock is already traded on an
open and efficient market, such that further disclosure is un-
necessary.’”168  The market capitalization of PolyMedica dur-
ing the class period was about $500 million.
(5) Cause and effect relationship: plaintiffs’ expert, Miller,
presented a chart which listed “the price change in
PolyMedica stock on [ ] five days, each of which had signifi-
cant news events:
• Reports of consumer complaints to government investiga-
tors (Mar. 23, 2001: 49.54% decline);
161. See id.
162. See In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 514–15 (1st Cir. 2005).
163. PolyMedica, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 267.
164. See id. at 268.
165. See, e.g., Xcelera.com, 430 F.3d at 516 (approving class certification where
there were only twenty market makers and seven that traded over one million
shares).
166. PolyMedica, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 268.
167. See id.
168. Id. (quoting Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombar-
dier, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 1898(SAS), 2006 WL 2161887, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006)).
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• PolyMedica’s response that those reports were rumors and
that it had not been contacted by any government agency
(Mar. 26, 2001: 42.65% rise);
• Announcement that shares would no longer be listed on
the NYSE (July 23, 2001: 29.52% decline);
• Report that PolyMedica may be indicted for Medicare and
investor fraud (Aug. 6, 2001: 32.17% decline);
• PolyMedica announcement that the U.S. attorney for the
Southern District of Florida was conducting an investiga-
tion into one of its units (Aug. 8, 2001: 17.65%
decline).”169
Miller also presented “a side-by-side comparison of movements in
the PolyMedica stock price, ‘peer group’ stock prices, and the
NASDAQ index and [stated] that ‘the dramatic price increases
and declines in the price of PolyMedica stock during the dis-
puted period in response to new company-specific information
were not mirrored in price movements of the NASDAQ Compos-
ite Index or the comparable company index.’”170
I would expect that most persons, reviewing the foregoing facts,
would conclude that PolyMedica traded in an efficient market.  To disre-
gard or fail to see the significance of facts such as an average weekly trad-
ing volume of 31% of the outstanding shares, seven analysts following the
stock, 193 market makers of whom 27 traded over one million shares each,
and a market capitalization of about $500 million (whereas a market capi-
talization of only $75 million would be sufficient to be eligible to file an
S-3 (short form) registration statement), suggests a lack of objectivity and
an outcome determinative mentality from the court.
(ii) The District Court’s Unrealistic Reliance upon Defendant’s Expert
According to the district court, the foregoing analysis by plaintiffs’
expert “leaves much to be desired.”171  To support this conclusion, the
court relied upon the following testimony of Dunbar, PolyMedica’s expert:
[Y]ou went and searched for the largest price drops.  That’s not a
scientific study.  A scientific study is one where you draw a sample
and then you compare a test statistic from that sample to another
sample . . . .  All you did was went and picked the largest stock
price drops and said, oh, gee, that just shows that it’s informa-
tionally efficient.  You picked five days out of about 160 trading
days.  What you should do is look at all 160 trading days and do a
scientific study to see if there’s a difference between the news
days and the non-news days.  And if you would have done that
169. Id. at 269 (bulleted list as appears in original).
170. Id.
171. Id.
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you would have found that there wasn’t any difference between
them. . . .
[I]f you picked news days as a sample, all news days, not just the
ones you self selected.  I mean, you selected the few news days
that would prove your point.  But there’s many other news days
in that contested period, anywhere from 23 to 59, versus [sic] on
how you want to count them.  If you want to look at what the
stock price reaction is on those news days versus the non-news
days, you’ll find that you can’t say that the news days were drawn
from a different sample than the non-news days.  In other words,
they were providing as much information to the market as the
non-news days.172
From the standpoint of rebutting plaintiffs’ evidence, it is the above
opinion of defendant’s expert that “leaves much to be desired.”  Dunbar
indicated that there were between twenty-three and fifty-nine news days.
This is a wide range of uncertainty, which also raises questions about the
materiality of the information on these various days, and whether any par-
ticular news item was within the expectations of the market or, on the
other hand, was a surprise.  Moreover, was any of the information on the
so-called news days as dramatic as the allegations of Medicare fraud, denial
of listing by the New York Stock Exchange, or possible criminal
indictment?
The following is the only stock graph during the relevant period that I
have been able to access.173
It shows a precipitous drop on March 26th, upon news of the govern-
ment’s investigation into Medicare fraud.  It shows a subsequent rise the
172. Id. at 269–70 (alterations and error in original).
173. Polymedica Dips on Report, CNN MONEY (Aug. 6, 2001, 12:29 PM), http://
money.cnn.com/2001/08/06/companies/polymedica/.
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following Monday, when PolyMedica’s investor conference call assured in-
vestors there were no problems.  The graph further shows a sharp decline
when it was announced that the New York Stock Exchange would not be
listing PolyMedica shares.  The graph ends before the announcement that
PolyMedica might be indicted for Medicare fraud, when another substan-
tial drop in price occurred.  The extent to which the market moved on the
150 or so days when there was either no news or “less significant” news is
irrelevant to the efficiency of the market with respect to the dramatic news
reports about PolyMedica.  As discussed in the next section, PolyMedica’s
expert fell into the trap of assuming that all news is digested immediately
by the market, without recognizing that the significance, complexity, and
mode of disclosure all affect the pace at which the market processes news.
Nevertheless, the court endorsed the above criticism of Miller and
stated with respect to the plaintiffs’ expert: “Miller’s mere listing of five
days on which news was released and which exhibited large price fluctua-
tions proves nothing.  Miller’s only marginally useful analysis—which he
oddly labels ‘not a significant factor’—is his unscientific comparison of
PolyMedica Stock to the NASDAQ index.”174
It is incomprehensible that a court could look at the price movements
reflected in the above graph, and as set forth by plaintiffs’ expert, and
conclude that they prove nothing.  This is particularly true when the testi-
mony is not in connection with a trial on the merits but rather relates to
the issue of whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of com-
monality for class certification.  Moreover, in point of fact, the analysis by
plaintiffs’ expert is considered scientific.  Comparing the price movements
in the defendant company’s stock with price movements of peer stocks
and an index such as NASDAQ is a scientific way of establishing that the
price movement with respect to the defendant company was caused by
factors over and above whatever factors impacted the movement of peer
stocks or the market as a whole.
(iii) The District Court’s Unrealistic Reliance on the Lack of Shares
Available for Short Selling
The district court was also influenced, in determining that the market
for PolyMedica stock was not efficient, by the situation with regard to short
selling.175  By April 2001, there was a huge amount of short interest; this
made obtaining additional shares to short difficult.176  In addition, a typi-
cal loan fee for lending stocks was 1%; during the summer of 2001, how-
ever, the loan fee with regard to PolyMedica was between 15% and
35%.177  According to Dunbar, this fact meant the market was inefficient
because persons who would have liked to have shorted the stock were not
174. PolyMedica, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 270.
175. See id. at 273–75.
176. See id. at 273.
177. See id. at 274.
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able to do so; thereby the market was denied the information that addi-
tional short selling would have brought to the market.  As Dunbar stated,
“the constraints on shorts will prevent people who don’t own the stock
from providing their viewpoints to the market.”178  The court agreed that
this was another significant factor supporting a lack of market
efficiency.179
What is paradoxical about this analysis is that the extent of short sell-
ing shows that many sophisticated investors believed that PolyMedica stock
was overpriced.  The large premium charged for lending the stock also
reflected the fact that the holder was worried that the stock might drop
precipitously before the holder received the stock back from the short
seller.  Thus, the short selling, and the impediments to additional short
selling, confirms the fact that PolyMedica was overpriced because of the
misrepresentations of the defendant.  Instead of focusing on this, the
court rejected efficiency because the market did not have all the short
selling information that the court believed it should have had.  Contrary to
the court’s opinion, the extent of short selling, the loan fee charged, and
the difficulty in accessing shares to short are all facts that are in the public
domain.
In addition, if stock is not available to loan to bearish investors to
enable them to sell it short, there is another vehicle for “bears” to show the
market that they believe the stock is overvalued—they could purchase
“put” options.180  But this possibility was never considered by the court.
(iv) The Unreasonable “One Day” Standard for “Informational
Efficiency”
Finally, the court determined that the time within which the market
must react to new information in order to be efficient was one day:
This Court, however, holds that the First Circuit’s definition and
relevant explanation of efficiency in PolyMedica, which stated that
stock price must quickly and fully reflect the release of public
information such that ordinary investors cannot profitably trade
on the basis of it, requires that the reaction to news be fully com-
pleted on the same trading day as its release—and perhaps even
within hours or minutes.181
Once again, the court fell into the trap of assuming that all news is
digested immediately by the market, without recognizing that the signifi-
cance, complexity, and mode of disclosure all affect the pace at which the
market processes news.  Moreover, paradoxically, the negative disclosures
178. Id. at 276.
179. See id.
180. See, e.g., Most-Active Options, YAHOO FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/op
tions/lists/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
181. PolyMedica, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 278 (footnote omitted).
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about PolyMedica relied upon by Miller, plaintiffs’ expert, all had a dra-
matic negative impact on the price of the stock within one day.  Conse-
quently, these disclosures thereby met the district court’s standard that the
information be impounded into the market within one day.  On the other
hand, the positive information injected by PolyMedica’s investor confer-
ence call probably took longer for the market to fully incorporate because
many potential buyers were probably waiting to see if confirmation of the
negative disclosures was in the offing.
The opinion on remand was also not true to the circuit court’s read-
ing of Basic.  To counter Judge Keeton’s analysis of Basic, the circuit court
quoted other provisions in Basic in which the Supreme Court referred to
all information: “[t]he market is acting as the unpaid agent of the investor,
informing him that given all the information available to it, the value of the
stock is worth the market price,” and that “the market price of shares
traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information.”
Note that the language of Basic that the circuit court quoted did not un-
qualifiedly refer to “all information.”  Rather it referred to all the “availa-
ble” information.  Arguably, then, if short selling information was not
available to the market, it was not relevant under Basic.  Again, paradoxi-
cally, much of the information the court discussed in determining that the
market lacked the information of putative short sellers was actually availa-
ble to the market.182
The opinions of the circuit court and the district court on remand are
classic examples which illustrate that a little knowledge can be a danger-
ous thing.  These opinions also support the conclusion that a legal liability
structure predicated upon a determination of whether or not the market
for a particular stock is efficient is based on whimsy, rather than reality.
B. Scholarly Rejection of Using Market Efficiency to Determine Reliance
Early on, Basic was criticized for arguably requiring an efficient mar-
ket in order to create a presumption of reliance.  A joint effort of law and
business professors asserted “substantial disagreement exists about to what
degree markets are efficient, how to test for efficiency, and even the defi-
nition of efficiency.”183  The same criticism holds true today.184  Moreo-
ver, two Nobel Prize winners in economics, Eugene Fama185 and Robert
182. See, e.g., NYSE Group Short Interest, NYSE MARKET DATA, http://www
.nyxdata.com/Data-Products/NYSE-Group-Short-Interest (last visited Jan. 11,
2015); Short Interest, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/quotes/short-interest.aspx
(last visited Jan. 11, 2015); see also How Do I Sell a Stock Short, INTERACTIVE BROKERS,
https://ibkb.interactivebrokers.com/article/232 (last visited Jan. 11, 2015); Short
Interest, SHORT SQUEEZE, http://shortsqueeze.com/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
183. Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reli-
ance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1991).
184. See generally Langevoort, supra note 119.
185. See generally NOBEL MEDIA, Eugene F. Fama—Facts, NOBELPRIZE.ORG,
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2013/
fama-facts.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
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Shiller,186 have taken opposing positions on whether the market is effi-
cient, Fama arguing that it is efficient and Shiller arguing that it is not.
The logic employed by many courts is that reliance depends upon
market efficiency, and market efficiency depends upon speed of adjust-
ment.  Thus, if market adjustment is “slow,” then the investor does not rely
for purposes of achieving class certification.  Professor Langevoort, in his
seminal article on the history of Basic, raises the fundamental question
about market efficiency and its reliance upon speed of market adjustment:
“what does speed of adjustment have to do with reliance on stock-price
integrity?”187  He asserts that “fraud can and does distort prevailing prices
even when adjustment is delayed or incomplete.”188
By way of illustration, Professor Langevoort used In re Merck & Co.
Securities Litigation.189  Merck, in 2002, ranked 24th on the Fortune 500
list;190 you would expect a market for its shares to be efficient.  However,
the question in Merck was not whether the market was efficient, but rather
at what point in time would information be impounded into the market
and affect the price.  Medco, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Merck, recog-
nized income attributable to a copayment made by a pharmacy customer
to the pharmacy, even though the subsidiary did not handle these copay-
ments.191  In a registration statement filed April 17, 2002, in connection
with a spinoff of Medco, Merck disclosed for the first time that Medco had
been recognizing revenue on this basis, but did not disclose the total
amount of revenue that had been improperly recognized.192  On the day
the registration statement was filed, Merck stock price went up from
$55.02 to $55.05.193
Almost two months later, “[o]n June 21, 2002, The Wall Street Journal
reported that Medco had been recognizing co-payments as revenue and
estimated that in 2001 $4.6 billion in co-payments had been [thereby] rec-
ognized.”194  That day Merck stock dropped $2.22, from $52.20 to
$49.98.195  Merck filed an amended registration statement on July 5, 2002,
and disclosed that Medco had recognized over $12.4 billion in “copay-
186. See generally NOBEL MEDIA, Robert J. Shiller—Facts, NOBELPRIZE.ORG,
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2013/
shiller-facts.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
187. Langevoort, supra note 119, at 169.
188. Id. at 161.
189. See id. at 173–78 (discussing In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261
(3d Cir. 2005)).
190. See Fortune 500: 2002 Full List, FORTUNE, http://archive.fortune.com/
magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/full/2002/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
191. See Merck, 432 F.3d at 264.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. Id. at 265.
195. Id.
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ment” revenue, of which $5.537 billion was recognized in 2001.196  Merck
stock declined to $43.57 on July 10th.197
The court noted that the Wall Street Journal reporter had derived her
figure by subtracting home delivery prescriptions from total prescriptions
filled in order to determine the number of retail prescriptions and then
assumed an average $10 copayment for each retail prescription.  The re-
porter then multiplied the two numbers together to arrive at the conclu-
sion that $4.6 billion had been improperly recognized.198  However,
according to the circuit court, the market made this determination on
April 17th when the price of Merck stock rose $.03, thereby demonstrating
that the information was not material: “The Journal reporter simply did the
math on June 21; the efficient market hypothesis suggests that the market
made these basic calculations months earlier.”199
In a very telling quote, the court stated: “If these analysts [who fol-
lowed Merck and focused on revenue growth] were unable for two months
to make a handful of calculations, how can we presume an efficient mar-
ket at all?”200  My conclusion from this data is that the analysts were capa-
ble of making these computations but did not, which in turn suggests that
the market is not necessarily all that efficient, even for a stock as signifi-
cant and widely traded as Merck.
Also consider Enron.  At the beginning of 2001, Enron stock was trad-
ing at about $84.201  On March 5, 2001, it was trading at about $70, when
Bethany McLean wrote her famous article in Fortune, Is Enron Over-
priced?202  That week, Enron trading was essentially flat; in fact the high on
Friday was higher than the high on Monday.203  The following week, En-
ron dropped roughly 10 points to about $60.204  For the next month,
there was a 10% dip and then a rise back to $60 in early May.205  So much
for the diligence and perspicaciousness of analysts!
By September, Enron stock had steadily dropped to $35, and by the
end of the year, it was worthless.206  Granted, the Enron business model
was more complicated than that of Medco; however, that complexity
should have led an “efficient” market, and the many analysts who covered
Enron, to be suspicious and inquisitive.  As McLean pointed out, Enron
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 270.
199. Id. at 271.
200. Id. at 270.
201. See Cara Ellison, Enron Historical Stock Price, https://caraellison.files.word
press.com/2009/09/enron-historical-data.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
202. Bethany McLean, Is Enron Overpriced?, CNN MONEY (Jan. 19, 2006, 11:34
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/01/13/news/companies/enronoriginal_for
tune/ (reposting article which originally appeared in Fortune on March 5, 2001).
203. See Ellison, supra note 201.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id.
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was the “It Girl” of Wall Street.  While Enron was secretive about its busi-
ness plan, warning signs were out there, including the disparity between
cash flow and income and the risky business model that it was
employing.207
Apropos to the subject of analyst diligence is the multi-analyst scandal
in connection with the dot-com bubble,208 which came to light in spring
2002.  New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer uncovered a number
of e-mails written by Merrill Lynch investment analysts, describing the
stock of various companies as “junk,” “crap,” and “a disaster;” unbelievably,
they publicly rated these stocks as a “buy.”209  Analysts hyped their ratings,
not just to obtain investment banking work for their firms, but sometimes
for personal profit, such as getting their daughters into nursery school.210
Merrill Lynch settled for $100 million and agreed to revise its prac-
tices with respect to analysts.211  Within a year of Merrill Lynch being
sued, ten top United States investment banking firms agreed to pay a total
of $875 million in penalties and disgorgement for similar practices.212
Pursuant to the settlement agreements, Wall Street agreed not to pressure
207. See McLean, supra note 202.
208. See Merrill Ordered to Reform Ratings: New York AG Wins Court Order Finding
Brokerage Firm Issued ‘Misleading Stock Ratings’, CNN MONEY, (Apr. 8, 2002, 8:35
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2002/04/08/news/companies/merrill/index.htm.
209. Merrill Lynch, LAWYERSHOP.COM, http://www.lawyershop.com/practice-ar
eas/criminal-law/white-collar-crimes/securities-fraud/lawsuits/merrill-lynch/ (last
visited Jan. 12, 2015).  Other examples include:
a. Internet Capital Group (ICGE):
1. E-mail: October 5, 2000—“Going to 5?” (strong sell); October 6,
2000—“No helpful news to relate, I’m afraid.  This has been a disas-
ter—there really is no floor to the stock.”
2. Investor advice: October 5, 2000—2-1 rating (buy to strong buy);
b. excite@home (ATHM):
1. E-mail: June 3, 2000—“ATHM is such a piece of crap!”
2. Investor advice: June 3, 2000—2-1 rating (buy to strong buy)”;
c. Lifeminders (LFMN):
1. E-mail: December 4, 2000—“I can’t believe what a POS that
thing is.”
2. Investor advice: December 4, 2000—2-1 rating (buy to strong
buy).
Id.
210. Jack Grubman, one of the leading analysts on Wall Street, sent an e-mail
stating that his boss, Sanford Weill, the chairman of Citigroup and a member of
the Board of Directors of AT&T, helped Grubman to get his twin daughters en-
rolled in an exclusive nursery school after Grubman began recommending AT&T
stock.  Mr. Weill has acknowledged that he asked Grubman to “take a fresh look at
AT&T,” which was code on Wall Street for changing your opinion. See Gretchen
Morgenson & Patrick McGeehan, Wall Street and the Nursery School: A New York Story,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2002), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C
03E3D71630F937A25752C1A9649C8B63&fta=y.
211. See The Merrill Lynch Settlement: Good for Merrill, Not for Investors, WHARTON
(June 5, 2002), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-merrill-lynch-
settlement-good-for-merrill-not-for-investors/.
212. See Joint Press Release, SEC, Ten of Nation’s Top Investment Firms Settle
Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Invest-
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analysts to give unwarranted ratings.  However, a couple of years later,
Rodman and Renshaw fired an analyst because he would not raise his
price target for a particular stock.213  So much for assuming the integrity
of analysts!
What the foregoing demonstrates is the folly of creating a legal struc-
ture predicated upon the efficiency of the market and the competence
and integrity of analysts.
There is a classic joke about an imprisoned economist who said that
he planned to escape by assuming a ladder.  This, in tongue-in-cheek fash-
ion, illustrates the extent to which economic theory is predicated upon
assumptions.  Unfortunately, some of the assumptions in the efficient mar-
ket theory are questionable.  The basic idea is that arbitrageurs will re-
spond to information by driving the price in the right direction.  If they
believe the price is too low, they will buy; if they believe the price is too
high, they will sell short.  This requires “that these arbitrageurs should face
no capital constraints and have infinite horizons.  More precisely, they
must have sufficient capital and long enough horizons to await patiently
the revelation of information or the reversal of sentiment underlying the
mispricing.”214  Particularly with respect to short selling, where the risk is
unlimited if the stock moves in the wrong direction, there are substantial
impediments to the idealized theory as to what the bearish arbitrageur will
commit to do.215  In addition, both momentum traders216 and the exis-
tence of herding217 can lead to inefficiency.  Again, is this the foundation
upon which to build a legal theory?
Another problem with the efficient market theory that is raised by
Professor Langevoort is that it is binary—either a market for a company’s
security is efficient or it is not efficient.218  “But there is no such thing as a
perfectly efficient market, and so it becomes easy for a court to miss the
forest for the trees by accepting too readily the defendants’ statistical evi-
dence of imperfection as reason not to certify.”219  One critique of the
PolyMedica decision is that the court never considered that “different kinds
ment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-
54.htm.
213. The analyst originally had an “outperform” recommendation, with a
price target of $2.88.  As the stock approached this price, he sought to downgrade
his recommendation to “market perform,” but instead, his director of research
recommended that he increase his price target. See Gretchen Morgenson, Did Wall
Street Really Learn Its Lesson?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2006), http://query.nytimes.com/
gst/fullpage.html?res=9905E6D91130F93AA35757C0A9609C8B63.
214. Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral
Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 483 (2006).
215. See id. at 480–83.
216. See id. at 496–97.
217. See id. at 494–95.
218. See Langevoort, supra note 119, at 167.
219. Id. at 173.
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of information are likely impounded at different rates of speed, even for
the same issuer.”220  The same is true of the court in Merck.
It is Alice in Wonderland type thinking to assume that all information—
irrespective of its significance, complexity, mode of disclosure, and con-
text of disclosure—would be assimilated at the same rate, particularly
within one day.  The pattern of the Merck stock movement actually illus-
trates this fact.  Is the market as likely to respond to an arguably buried
fact in a multipage registration statement in as quick and decisive a man-
ner as it would to a thoughtful and clearly laid out article in the Wall Street
Journal, which in turn must be contrasted with an affirmative, clear, de-
tailed acknowledgment by the company?  To hold that all information is
rapidly (i.e., within one day) assimilated by the market, irrespective of its
complexity and mode of distribution, is to endow the market with
omniscience.
At a minimum, even if reliance is related to stock price integrity per
Basic, rather than informational integrity, “rigorous insistence on a show-
ing of market impact would seem to obviate the need to also show market
efficiency . . . .”221
V. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF RELIANCE, MATERIALITY,
AND LOSS CAUSATION
A. Fraud on the Market Reliance and Materiality: The Amgen Confusion
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Amgen222—in rejecting the requirement
that plaintiffs must prove materiality in order for a class to be certified—
was characterized by the dissenters as simplistic and illogical223 and fur-
ther muddied the waters as to what must be proved and when.
Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that materiality “indisputably” “is an
essential predicate of the fraud-on-the-market theory . . . .”224  She also
acknowledged that materiality is an essential element of a Rule 10b-5 cause
of action.225  However, since materiality is an objective standard, the issue
of materiality is common to all class members and thus need not be
proven at the class certification stage.226  Rather, it is an element of a Rule
10b-5 action that will be determined on the merits at trial.227  Thus far the
opinion makes sense.
However, Justice Thomas, speaking for the dissenters, noted that ma-
teriality is an element of the fraud on the market theory and critiqued the
majority opinion on the basis that “the Court transforms the predicate
220. Id. at 170.
221. Id. at 179 (citing Macey et al., supra note 183, at 1018).
222. 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
223. See id. at 1206–07 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 1195 (majority opinion).
225. See id. at 1191–92.
226. See id. at 1197.
227. See id.
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certification inquiry into a novel either-or inquiry occurring much later on
the merits.”228  He argued:
According to the Court, either (1) plaintiffs will prove materiality
on the merits, thus demonstrating ex post that common questions
predominated at certification, or (2) they will fail to prove mate-
riality, at which point we learn ex post that certification was inap-
propriate because reliance was not, in fact, a common question.
In the Court’s second scenario, fraud on the market was never
established, reliance for each class member was inherently indi-
vidualized, and Rule 23(b)(3) in fact should have barred certifi-
cation long ago.  The Court suggests that the problem created by
the second scenario is excusable because the plaintiffs will lose
anyway on alternative merits grounds, and the case will be
over.229
Justice Ginsburg’s holding that materiality need not be proven at the
class certification stage would seem to be sophistry if, in establishing reli-
ance through fraud on the market, materiality must be proven at the class
certification stage as an element of the fraud on the market doctrine.  On
the other hand, her opinion would make sense if either there are two
different aspects of materiality, or if materiality is not an element of the
fraud on the market hypothesis.
Justice Ginsburg’s holding could be justified on the basis that there is
materiality in general and materiality specific to plaintiffs’ claims.  Con-
sider again Justice Roberts’s hypothetical in Halliburton II, in which there
were six event studies, one of which involved the specific misrepresenta-
tion alleged by plaintiffs as the basis for their suit; even though there was
no price impact with respect to the specific misrepresentation challenged
in the suit, the evidence showed an efficient market.230  To Justice Rob-
erts, it would make no sense to certify the class action in such a
situation.231
But what if the defendant and/or plaintiffs had provided price impact
with respect to five events, none of which involved the current alleged
misrepresentation, but all of which showed price impact, consequently
228. Id. at 1211 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
229. Id. (footnote omitted).
230. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2415 (2014).
231. His discussion of the consequences of the foregoing is confusing, as he
posits that there is an efficient market, but in summarizing the plaintiffs’ view,
states that the “action should be certified and proceed as a class action (with all
that entails), even though the fraud-on-the-market theory does not apply and com-
mon reliance thus cannot be presumed.” Id.  But, if the class were to be certified,
this would mean that the fraud on the market theory did apply.  The paradox is
that the class action could proceed even though the ultimate result is already
known, namely, the plaintiffs must fail because the plaintiffs cannot establish price
impact, which means either that the misrepresentation was not material or that
there were no damages.
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compelling the conclusion that the market was efficient?  Here we have an
alleged misrepresentation made in an efficient market, which, under Ba-
sic, should support a presumption of reliance—and the materiality of the
misrepresentation which led to the present litigation would be determined
at trial.  This is an example of materiality in general but not with respect to
the particular case.  While this is a possibility, it is not a very likely
possibility.
The materiality of the litigated misrepresentation is not necessarily
relevant to the question of whether the market is efficient.  Arguably, the
market impounds all information, both material and immaterial, since the
price of the stock impounds many pieces of information, any one of which
might not be significant but could become significant in the aggregate.
Consequently, whether the alleged misrepresentations were material does
not necessarily impact reliance.  The investor would rely upon the integ-
rity of the market price, according to Basic, or on the total mix of informa-
tion in the market, according to this Article, in purchasing the stock—
irrespective of whether the investor was defrauded through misrepresenta-
tions or otherwise.  Whether the investor relied and whether the investor
was defrauded are two separate questions.
This conclusion is supported by the facts of the Basic case.  The dis-
trict court certified the class on the fraud on the market theory, but it
granted a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the misrepre-
sentations were not material.  Thus, at the district court level, the court
certified a class irrespective of the materiality of the representations.
Notwithstanding the foregoing defense of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion,
if materiality is an element of the fraud on the market theory, then it
makes no sense to litigate the issue twice.  Arguably, if lack of materiality is
established in the certification process, then issue preclusion should pre-
vent re-litigation of this issue.  But, according to Justice Thomas, what is
the point of continuing the litigation if, at the certification stage, we know
the plaintiff cannot prevail?
B. Materiality, Price Impact, and Loss Causation
Price impact, materiality, and loss causation are all intensely factual
issues which should be determined in a trial on the merits, before a trier
of fact—which could well be a jury—not in a mini-trial at the class certifi-
cation stage, with a judge determining the factual issues.  Previous Su-
preme Court decisions have determined that neither materiality232 nor
loss causation233 need to be proven by plaintiffs at the class certification
stage.  But Justice Roberts, in Halliburton II, determined that “defendants
may introduce price impact evidence at the class certification stage, so
long as it is for the purpose of countering a plaintiff’s showing of market
232. See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1197.
233. See Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184–87 (2011).
38
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss1/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-1\VLR105.txt unknown Seq: 39  9-MAR-15 10:28
2015] THE NEED FOR A NEW PARADIGM 241
efficiency, rather than directly rebutting the presumption [of
reliance].”234
But, price impact, materiality, and loss causation are all interrelated.
Thus, evidence related to all three will be adduced at the class certification
stage, and, if plaintiffs are successful in achieving certification, again at the
trial on the merits.  For example, the expert report of the plaintiffs in
Halliburton I235 dealt with market efficiency (of which price impact is a
factor),236 materiality,237 and loss causation.238  With respect to material-
ity, Jane D. Nettesheim, plaintiffs’ expert, stated:
It must be noted that a statistically significant change in a com-
pany’s security’s price (net of market and industry effects) is an
indicator that new company-specific information has dramatically
changed the total mix of information about a company . . . .  In-
formation “important enough to affect security prices when pub-
licly released provides compelling evidence that a reasonable
investor would consider the information important in making an
investment decision.”239
Thus, the correlation of price impact upon materiality; further, without
price impact, there would be no loss causation.
If investors are rational—and there is thinking that questions that as-
sumption240—and if there is no market manipulation,241 then immaterial
234. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2414–15.
235. See Report of Jane D. Nettesheim, in Joint Appendix Volume I at 163a–262a,
Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (No. 09-1403), 2011 WL 705206.
236. See id. at 167a–208a.
237. See id. at 208a–13a.
238. See id. at 213a–62a.
239. Id. at 211a (quoting Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffrey M. Netter, The Role of
Financial Economics in Securities Fraud Cases: Applications at the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 49 BUS. LAW. 545, 549 (1994)).
240. See, e.g., Jeremy Clift, Questioning a Chastened Priesthood, 46 FIN. & DEV. 4, 4
(Sept. 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2009/09/
people.htm (“[M]arkets are plagued by herding behavior and groupthink . . . .”);
see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 151. See generally MARTIN SEWELL, BEHAVIOURAL FI-
NANCE (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.behaviouralfinance.net/behavioural-fi-
nance.pdf.
241. When the market goes up and the economic and political news is nega-
tive, it could be asserted that either the market is not rational or that the market is
being manipulated.  From February to August 2014, the Dow Jones Industrial Aver-
age moved from under 16,000 to over 17,000 before—in the first part of August
2014—falling back to the middle of that range.  The only positive domestic eco-
nomic news had been in job gains, but the wages in the new jobs were 23% lower
than the jobs that were lost in the recession. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, U.S.
METRO ECONOMIES: INCOME AND WAGE GAPS ACROSS THE U.S. 2 fig.1 (Aug. 2014),
available at http://www.usmayors.org/metroeconomies/2014/08/report.pdf.
Thus, purchasing power was lagging.  Capital expenditures were 15% less than the
pattern prior to the recession; businesses were holding onto $1.8 trillion in cash,
rather than investing to create jobs and increase productivity. See Jamie McGeever,
‘Capex’ Mystery Confounds Experts, CHI. TRIB. (Aug.12, 2014), http://ireader.olivesoft
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information, by itself, should have no impact on price and material infor-
mation should affect the price.  Much of the alleged fraud in publicly
traded securities arises from management’s attempt to maintain the price
of the stock when it knows that the position of the company is deteriorat-
ing.  In such a situation, the arguably material misrepresentation takes
place at one point in time, and the price impact is reflected at another
point in time, when the truth comes out.  But the materiality of the infor-
mation will be evidenced by the price impact when the truth comes out.
Again, consider the Tellabs situation.  In December 2000 through
March 2001, the CEO made misleading statements with respect to the con-
tinued growth of the company.  In June, when the truth came out—
namely, that sales of a major product had markedly decreased—the price
of the stock plummeted.  This is a pattern that repeats itself over and over
again.242  Consequently, there is a clear correlation between the material-
ity of an alleged misrepresentation, the price impact of such misrepresen-
tation, and the plaintiffs’ damages.  It would seem logical and efficient
that these issues would then be litigated at the same time.
ware.com/Olive/iReader/chicagotribune/SharedArticle.ashx?document=CTC%5
C2014%5C08%5C12&article=Ar03902.  Externally, the economy of Europe was
shaky, growth in China had dropped, Russia was threatening war with the Ukraine,
Israel and Hamas were at war, and Iraq and Syria were in chaos.  What was the
news that was driving the overall market?
The market for individual stocks is also of questionable rationality.  When you
compare the price of Amazon on August 1, 2013 with that of August 1, 2014, the
price would appear to be essentially flat.  Amazon closed at $305 on August 1,
2013, and at $307 on August 1, 2014.  But the price of Amazon dropped to $279 on
August 28, 2013, and then rose to $399 on December 2, 2013.  This is a 43% in-
crease in a little over three months.  It rose to $408 on January 22, 2014, but then
dropped to $337 on February 5, 2014.  This is a 17% drop in two weeks.  It then
rose to $383 on March 13, 2014, or a 13% increase in a little over a month, before
dropping to $284 on May 9, 2014.  This is a 25% drop in less than two months.  It
then rose to $364 on July 24, 2014, a 28% increase in a little over two months,
before dropping to $304 on August 1, 2014, a 16% drop in a week.  Amazon’s P/E
ratio is almost 500. See Amazon.com Inc. (AMZN) Historical Prices, YAHOO FIN.,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=AMZN+Historical+Prices (last visited Jan. 12,
2015).
The volatility of Netflix was even greater.  Its price rose from $319 on January
15, 2014, to $457 on February 25, 2014, a 42% increase in less than a month and a
half.  It then dropped to $299 on April 28, 2014, a 34% drop in two months.  Fi-
nally, it rose to $475 on July 2, 2014, a 58% increase in a little over two months.
Netflix’s P/E ratio is around 160. See Netflix, Inc. (NFLX) Historical Prices, YAHOO
FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=NFLX+Historical+Prices (last visited Jan.
12, 2015).
At best, this is a pattern of trading, not investing, and, at worst, raises a ques-
tion of manipulation.  The market for the stocks would certainly seem to be “effi-
cient.”  Amazon had a market capitalization of over $140 billion and an average
daily volume of about 3.8 million shares.  Netflix had a market capitalization of
about $26 billion and an average daily volume of about 2.7 million shares.  There
appears to be little in the way of “news” that would justify price swings of such
magnitude.
242. See generally Murdock, supra note 11 (discussing cases that illustrate this
pattern).
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Justice Roberts, in Halliburton I, determined that loss causation need
not be established at the class certification stage since reliance relates to
the transaction causation and not loss causation.  Thereafter, Justice Gins-
burg, in Amgen, determined that materiality need not be proven at the
class certification stage, because materiality is common to all plaintiffs as it
is an objective standard.  But if price impact is litigated at the class certifi-
cation stage, according to Justice Roberts in Halliburton II, then we are
once again bifurcating issues that ought to be tried together.  From the
standpoint of judicial economy and cost of litigation, these intensely fac-
tual issues should be determined in a trial on the merits.  This would be
possible if we backed away from the current interpretation of fraud on the
market as indicating reliance on price integrity and recognized that what
the market relies upon is information integrity.
VI. FRAUDULENT DISTORTION
As this Article was nearing completion, a very thoughtful article by
Professors Bebchuk and Ferrell was published in The Business Lawyer.243
While the article was published after the Supreme Court decided Hallibur-
ton II,244 an earlier draft of the article had been circulated before the
briefing of the case and was cited by the main briefs of both sides.245
Briefly stated, the authors would replace reliance on the efficiency of the
market with “reliance on the market price not being impacted by (and
thus reflecting) misstatements and omissions”246 or, in other words, not
being impacted by fraudulent distortion.
The foregoing authors do an excellent job of arguing against the con-
tinued reliance on market efficiency as a basis for presuming reliance.
While the courts, in dealing with the fraud on the market presumption,
have treated efficiency as a binary concept—the market is either efficient
or not efficient—Professors Bebchuk and Ferrell also argue that efficiency
is a “continuum.”247
While the approach of Professors Bebchuk and Ferrell is superior to
the present focus on market efficiency, it poses two difficulties.  First of all,
it is phrased in the negative, namely, that investors rely upon an absence
of fraudulent distortion; secondly, it posits that investors rely upon a result
rather than a cause.  Once again, consider Tellabs.  When management
states that one major product is experiencing high demand, whereas in
fact demand is drying up, and that a successor product is ready to ship,
when in fact it is not, the market price is maintained at an artificially high
243. See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 38.
244. The article was published in the May issue of The Business Lawyer, but it
was not distributed until late July or early August.  The decision of the Supreme
Court in Halliburton II came down on June 23, 2014.
245. See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 38, at 675.
246. Id. at 686.
247. See id. at 689–90.
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level.  This situation is in fact fraudulent distortion.  But what investors
rely upon is that the information introduced into the market by manage-
ment is in fact truthful and accurate.  If management had said that Tel-
labs’ business was substantially declining, investors would not have bought
at the then existing market price.  What investors rely upon is the truthful-
ness of the information in the market.
Moreover, any liability regime which posits reliance on the price of a
security remains open to those who argue that investors do not rely on the
price of the security.  Professors Bebchuk and Ferrell assert that “[u]nder
our approach, market prices need not be relied on or assumed by inves-
tors to reflect true value.  Fraudulent distortion merely turns on whether
the market price is different from what it otherwise would have been ab-
sent the fraud.”248  What then do investors rely upon?  If you assert that
they rely upon a price not affected by fraudulent misrepresentations, are
you not really asserting that they rely upon the truthfulness of the mix of
information in the marketplace?
The professors phrased the fraud on the market rule as consisting of
three propositions:
(A1) The price of a security traded in an efficient market will
reflect all publicly available information about a company;
(A2) Accordingly, a buyer of the security in an efficient market
may be presumed to have relied on public information in
purchasing the security; and
(A3) Where the market for a security is inefficient, a plaintiff
cannot invoke the fraud on the market presumption.249
They then recast the foregoing propositions as follows:
(B1) The price of a security traded in an efficient a public market
will reflect all some publicly available information about a
company;
(B2) Accordingly, a buyer of the security in an efficient a public
market may be presumed to have relied on public informa-
tion in purchasing the security on the market price not being
fraudulently distorted, i.e., not being different from what it would
have been absent the disclosure deficiency; and
(B3) Where the market price for a security is inefficient not fraud-
ulently distorted, a plaintiff cannot invoke the fraud-on-the-
market classwide reliance presumption.250
248. Id. at 688.
249. Id. at 685.
250. Id. at 686 (strikethroughs indicating deletions and italics indicating
additions).
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Let’s examine this new proposition.  First of all, it recognizes that a
public market need not impound all publicly available information before
investors can be defrauded by misleading statements from corporate man-
agement.  This is sound.  Secondly, it recognizes that misleading informa-
tion may have the effect of distorting price.  This also is sound.  But the
third proposition then uses the presence or absence of price distortion to
determine reliance, whereas the existence of price distortion, or the lack
thereof, much more logically relates to both materiality and loss causation.
In addition, this approach arguably is also subject to the issues raised by
Justice White in his dissent in Basic.
As stated earlier, what investors really rely upon is the truthfulness of
the information that is in the public markets.  In the Tellabs example, in-
vestors relied upon public information that the sales of the 5500 contin-
ued apace and that the 6500 was ready for shipment and customers were
eagerly awaiting it.  If management had told the truth, investors would not
have bought, and the price of Tellabs’ stock would have plummeted, as it
did when the truth was revealed.
Let me paraphrase what I have been asserting in this Article as a mod-
ification of Professors Bebchuk and Ferrell’s modification of the three Ba-
sic propositions.  Thus:
(i) The price of a security traded in a public market will reflect
some publicly available information about a company (thus,
my first proposition would be identical to the theirs, al-
though I would accept substituting “most” for “some”);
(ii) Accordingly, a buyer of the security in a public market may
be presumed to have relied on public information in
purchasing the security; and
(iii) A defendant may rebut the presumption of reliance by prov-
ing that the misrepresentation did not affect the decision of
a typical investor to purchase, i.e., the misrepresentation
was not objectively material.251
This is clearly a simpler approach to the issue of reliance.  Arguably, it is
also more straightforward.  Adopting this approach would undoubtedly
enrage defense counsel and the Business Roundtable, because it would
simplify the certification process and eliminate all of the litigation over
market efficiency.  It would then leave the issues of materiality and loss
causation to trial since they are factual issues common to all the plaintiffs.
On the other hand, if an alleged material misstatement is so insubstantial
251. All of these three-proposition formulations are assuming that the plain-
tiff is a purchaser.  This assumption is because most of the time management is
trying to support the price of the shares and the purchaser overpays.  In other
words, management is putting good news into the marketplace.  However, Basic
itself dealt with a “bad news” situation, i.e., that no merger negotiations were tak-
ing place.  In such a situation, the focus would be upon the seller being defrauded.
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as to be determined immaterial as a matter of law, this could be dealt with
at the class certification stage, or on a motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment.  All that would need to be established at the class certification
stage is that the defendant company, and its management, inserted mis-
leading material into the public marketplace.  I would also accept a lim-
ited determination of materiality at the class certification stage: namely,
whether the alleged misrepresentations were of the kind that a reasonable
investor would normally rely upon.
Another way of comparing this approach to that of Professors
Bebchuk and Ferrell is that their approach would permit, at the class certi-
fication stage, what Justice Roberts ultimately held in Halliburton II: that
“defendants must be afforded an opportunity before class certification to
defeat the presumption through evidence that an alleged misrepresenta-
tion did not actually affect the market price of the stock.”252  While Profes-
sors Bebchuk and Ferrell did not take a definitive position on whether the
plaintiff or the defendant, at the class certification stage, should have the
burden of proof on price impact, Justice Roberts appears to make the lack
of price distortion an affirmative defense, with respect to which the defen-
dant should have the burden.  Putting that issue to one side, their ap-
proach clearly presents this issue of price impact for resolution at the
certification stage, with the bifurcation of issues that ought to be tried
together.
On the other hand, under the approach advocated by this Article,
reliance flows from “information distortion,” not price distortion.  Accord-
ingly, at the certification stage, the only issue for resolution is whether the
defendant corporation and its management introduced misleading infor-
mation into the marketplace.  If they have, reliance should be presumed.
It could be argued that the effect of this approach is to make class certifi-
cation a routine matter.  And that is correct.  It should be a routine mat-
ter, as it was before courts started using the class certification process to
hold a mini-trial.  As has been developed in this Article, factual matters,
such as materiality, price distortion, and loss causation, together with sci-
enter, should be developed in one proceeding at trial.
VII. CONCLUSION
Where are we after the Sturm und Drang of three United States Su-
preme Court decisions in three years253 grappling with the contours of the
fraud on the market theory?  I would argue that the present legal regime
for private securities litigation is irrational, wasteful and inefficient, biased
in favor of management as opposed to investors, and built upon illusion,
not reality.  The Supreme Court is wandering in an illogical thicket from
which it cannot extricate itself.  It is ideologically divided: the conserva-
252. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014).
253. See, e.g., Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398; Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans &
Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013); Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
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tives are on a mission to protect business and management, sometimes
corrupt management, from the onslaught of consumers, employees, and
investors, while the liberals are fighting a rearguard action to prevent as
much damage as possible.
Consider the contours of a private securities case.  The plaintiff files a
complaint which must set forth the misrepresentations with specificity—
sufficient particularity to satisfy the sometimes unreasonable expectations
of the federal courts—and must also set forth facts giving rise to a strong
inference of scienter.  The plaintiff is then met with a motion to dismiss
which is to be heard before the plaintiff has an opportunity for discovery.
The detail expected by federal courts often can only be obtained through
confidential informants.  However, confidential informants are viewed
with a high degree of suspicion by federal courts.254
If the plaintiff surmounts the motion to dismiss and the expectations
of pleading particularity, the next step is class certification.  Some courts
bifurcate discovery between that necessary for certification and that neces-
sary for the trial on the merits.  Supposedly, the discovery for class certifi-
cation would be limited but, as a result of Halliburton II, the defendant can
now raise price impact, which is intimately related to materiality and loss
causation.  However, the plaintiff is entitled to a presumption of reliance,
or transaction causation, as a result of the fraud on the market theory.  But
one of the elements of the fraud on the market theory, according to the
courts, is materiality, which, according to Amgen, is a matter to be ad-
dressed at a trial on the merits.  Is this the clarity we would expect when
billions of dollars are at stake?
According to most courts, the benefit of the fraud on the market pre-
sumption is only available when the market is efficient.  Market efficiency
is a concept developed by economics and finance professors to support
the arguable proposition that the individual investor cannot beat the mar-
ket.  Its origins had nothing to do with securities fraud.  The Nobel Prize
in economics has been awarded to two professors who have opposing view-
points on whether the market is efficient.  Courts seem to regard market
efficiency as a binary proposition and expect that, in an efficient market,
material information will be quickly—in as little time as one day—im-
pounded into the price of the company’s stock.  They give no credence to
the idea that there are degrees of market efficiency, degrees of materiality,
varying modes of communicating information to the market, varying pro-
bity of the sources of the information, and different degrees of complexity
of the information so transmitted—all of which logically would affect the
time necessary for information to be impounded into the market.  This is
a legal structure built upon an illusion.
254. See, e.g., Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir.
2007) (Easterbrook, J.) (asserting that information supplied by confidential
sources must be “discounted,” usually “steep[ly]”).
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Since the reality is that there is no such thing as a perfectly efficient
market, as one scholar has stated, “it becomes easy for a court to miss the
forest for the trees by accepting too readily the defendants’ statistical evi-
dence of imperfection as reason not to certify.”255
If the plaintiff does not succeed in obtaining class certification, that is
usually the end of the litigation because most individual plaintiffs do not
have a sufficient economic stake to carry on the cost of litigation on their
own.  If the plaintiff does succeed in certification, we then move on to
discovery on the merits and eventually to trial.
Materiality, price distortion, and loss causation are all intertwined and
highly factual issues.  But the effect of these three Supreme Court deci-
sions is to bifurcate these issues.  This bifurcation only adds to the expense
and confusion of litigation.
After almost seventy years of private securities litigation, it is time to
step back and examine whether there is a more sensible approach.  The
starting place would be the securities laws themselves and the purposes for
which they were enacted.  The prevalence of fraud in the securities mar-
kets was clearly an impetus for the enactment of the securities laws; it is
further clear that the securities laws were enacted for the protection of
investors and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets.  More-
over, as former Justice Stevens has stated, “[f]ashioning appropriate reme-
dies for the violation of rules of law designed to protect a class of citizens
was the routine business of judges,”256 or at least it was until a supposedly
conservative, but in reality reactionary, Supreme Court began cutting away
at investor protection.
As other scholars have recognized, “proving the efficiency of the mar-
ket as a whole is only an indirect means of proving that the market relied
on a particular statement.”257 Basic, in discussing materiality, focused on
the fact that investors would be guided by the total mix of information
available.  It is this total mix of information upon which the investment
community relies and which determines the price of the stock.  Mandatory
reporting under the securities laws provides much of this mix of informa-
tion, while voluntary corporate disclosures, such as press releases and in-
vestor conference calls,258 provide additional information.  These sources
of information are supplemented by analyst reports and other third-party-
generated information.
Since a major purpose of the securities laws was to provide investors
with information, and since the purpose of the antifraud provisions is to
ensure truthfulness, it seems far more logical to presume that investors
rely upon this total mix of information, rather than believing the fantasy
255. Langevoort, supra note 119, at 173.
256. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148,
177 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
257. Brief of Law Professors, supra note 120, at 24.
258. See What Is an Earnings Conference Call?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.inves
topedia.com/ask/answers/04/052104.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
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that they rely upon the integrity of market prices.  What they rely upon is
the integrity of the information that corporate management has intro-
duced into the market.  The integrity, or lack thereof, of market prices is a
matter for a damage determination, namely, loss causation, not for reli-
ance, transaction causation.
If this view of reliance is adopted, then the meaty factual issues of
materiality, price distortion, and loss causation can be addressed at trial—
which is where they belong.  Rejecting the focus on market efficiency will,
first, eliminate the present practice of ruminating about some idealized
notion of an efficient market.  Second, it will eliminate the use of minor
imperfections in this idealized model to justify dismissal of class certifica-
tion, and thus effectively avoid the termination of lawsuits that may well be
meritorious.  The focus of courts should be upon protecting investors and
holding management accountable; too often the converse is true.
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